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Statement of Jurisdiction
Appellee Mr. Shuster agrees with the brief of Applied Computer
Techniques, Inc. (ACT) that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
from a final judgment of the Circuit Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d)(1952, as amended).

Statement of the Issues Presented for Review
Appellee Mr. Shuster does not agree with ACT's statement of the
issues in its brief.1 The issue set forth in ACT's Docketing Statement(s)
was:
"Whether or not the trial court properly interpreted Appellee's
employment agreement."
Appellee Shuster agrees with this statement of the issues on appeal and
agrees that ACT preserved this issue for appeal.

1

ACT's brief contends that the issue is "whether or not Shuster was a
commissioned salesman or worked for wages." (Br. 2) This reframing of the
issue leads appellant ACT to argues one point (III) which was not disputed
before the trial court and was not preserved for appeal. ACT also seeks the
remedy of vacating the judgment for Shuster on all counts and granting
summary judgment for ACT. This remedy is not available given ACT's prior
failures to contest ACT's liability under the Utah Payment of Wages Act and to
contest ACT's liability for attorneys fees. See infra.

1

Standard or Review
Appellee Shuster agrees with ACT's statement of the standard of
review.

This Court should review for correctness the trial court's

conclusions of law regarding the unambiguous nature of and the meaning
of the contract, since there were no issues of material fact in dispute. Alf
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah, 1993).

Statutory Provisions
The following statutes and regulations are important to portions of
this appeal, and they are set forth in Addendum A:
Utah Attorney's Fees for Suits for Wages, Utah Code Ann. § 3427-1
Utah Payment of Wages Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-1, § 34-28-2 and § 34-28-5
Utah Minimum Wage Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 34-40-101 - 103 and § 34-40-104(1)(a)
United States Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1) and §213(a)(1)
29 C.F.R. § 541.5(a)
Utah Administrative Code R572-1-3

Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
The case concerns the interpretation of an Employment Agreement

2

(R 8-13; Addendum B) between ACT (the employer) and Mr. Shuster (the
employee). The sole question on appeal is whether this contract required
ACT to pay Mr. Shuster $750 for his final two weeks of work for ACT.
Course of the Proceedings
Appellee Shuster accepts ACT's Statement regarding the Course
of Proceedings except to augment it as follows:
Proceedings Before the Trial Court
Shuster's Motion for Summary Judgment (R 62-64) relied only
upon the Complaint (with attachments, including the contract) (R 1-17;
Addendum B) and the Answer.(R 20-22; Add. C) Shuster's Memorandum
(R 65-76 Add. D) set forth undisputed material facts relying upon these
pleadings alone; Defendant ACT did not identify any of these facts as
disputed. (R 91-96 ACT's Response; Add. E) Shuster contended in the
trial court that there were no issues of material fact in dispute; and
defendant ACT did not disagree.2 (R 108-116 Reply Memorandum Add. G)
ACT's Motion for Summary Judgment (R 105-106) was supported
by the Affidavit of ACT's President (R 97-98; Add. F).

It was filed

2

Rule 4-501 (2)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration provides: "All
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by
an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose
of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's
statement."
3

together with ACT's Response (R 91-96; Add. E) which argued for
Summary Judgment for ACT and which contained various statements of
fact that Shuster disputed. Shuster submitted his Affidavit (R 117-121;
Add. H) disputing these facts as well as the Memorandum specifically
controverting the "facts" he disputed. (R 108-116; Add. G)
Based upon these pleadings and after oral argument, the Circuit
Court denied ACT's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Mr.
Shuster's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R 141-142, Memorandum
Decision; Add. J)
Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals
After ACT filed its Docketing Statement with this Court, Appellee
Shuster filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, Dismissal and Sanctions.
This Court denied the Motions for Summary Disposition or Dismissal. This
Court ordered that ruling on the other issues (sanctions) be deferred until
plenary presentation and consideration. (Order August 8, 1994)
Statement of Facts
Appellee Shuster does not agree with the Statement of Facts set
forth in ACT's brief. The trial court relied upon Shuster's undisputed
Statement of Material Facts and upon the pleadings (the Complaint, the
admitted documents attached thereto-including the contract--and the
Answer), and the Circuit Court made the following Findings of Fact.
4

Appellee Shuster presents the trial court's Findings of Fact to this Court
as a proper and undisputed Statement of Facts on appeal:
1. The parties entered into a valid contract for employment on or
about February 26, 1992, a copy of which is attached to the
Complaint as Exhibit A.
2. From February 26, 1992 to October 14, 1992 the plaintiff Mr.
Shuster worked for the defendant ACT, "devoting all his time and
energy during normal business hours" to ACT's business.
3. From February 26, 1992 to September 30, 1992, ACT paid Mr.
Shuster the "gross pay" provided for under Paragraph 6 of the
Employment Agreement, since the commissions earned never
exceeded such "gross pay."
4. The employment relationship ended on October 15, 1992. At
that time Mr. Shuster made written demand to ACT for payment of
wages for his work from October 1, 1992 through October 14,
1992.
5.

On October 19, 1992 ACT wrote Mr. Shuster and refused to

pay any wages whatsoever for this two-week period, on the
grounds that "no commissions were earned" during that period.
ACT paid no wages at all at that time for that two-week period of
work.
5

6.

On November 19, 1992, Mr. Shuster again wrote and

demanded the "gross pay" of $750 provided for in the Employment
Agreement. Mr. Shuster further informed ACT that its failure to
pay him any amount whatsoever not only violated the Agreement
but violated state and federal minimum wage law.
7. On or about December 1, 1992 ACT paid Mr. Shuster gross pay
of $340, representing minimum wage for 80 hours of work; but
again failed and refused to pay the full gross pay totalling $750 as
demanded in accordance with the Employment Agreement.
(R 148-151 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Addendum K)

Summary of Arguments
The contract between the employer ACT and its employee Mr.
Shuster is unambiguous and required ACT to pay Mr. Shuster "gross pay"
of $750 for his final two weeks of full-time work for ACT.
ACT's argument that Mr. Shuster was paid "commissions" and not
"wages" is wrong and improperly raised for the first time on appeal.
If this Court affirms the judgment for appellee Shuster, this Court
should remand the case for calculation of attorneys' fees for legal work
on appeal.
This Court should sanction appellant ACT for its failure to comply
with Appellate Rules of Procedure; its improper and erroneous statements
6

of facts (both here and in the Docketing Statement); and its attempt to
raise issues in its brief which have not been preserved for appeal.

Argument
I. THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT UNAMBIGUOUSLY REQUIRED ACT
TO PAY MR. SHUSTER GROSS PAY OF $750 FOR HIS FINAL TWO
WEEKS OF WORK.
The Employment Agreement itself is admitted to by both parties.
The only issue is the interpretation of this employment contract.
A.

This Contract Should be Interpreted According to its Plain

Meaning.
The interpretation of the Employment Agreement is a matter of law.
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P. 2d 5 8 1 , 582
(Utah, 1988). Whether this contract is ambiguous and requires parol
evidence to understand is itself a question of law. Faulkner v.
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah, 1983). The Circuit Court was
correct in finding that this contract is not ambiguous.
The terms of this contract should be interpreted "according to their
plain and ordinary meaning." Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross,
849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah. App., 1993) cert, denied 860 P.2d 943

7

(Utah, 1993). The plain and ordinary meaning of this contract is that the
plaintiff was entitled to the "gross pay" of $750 for his final t w o weeks
of work.
B. The Contract Unambiguously Required ACT to Pay Mr. Shuster
$750 Each Pay Day.
Paragraph 5 of the Agreement states that the Employer will pay the
employee "a commission" for "all services." (R 9-10; in Addendum

B)

Paragraphs 5A - 5D set forth a complicated structure for calculating when
"commissions" are due and how to calculate them. Paragraph 5D even
provides

that

employment

the

employee

will

be paid

commissions

after

his

ends if a sale is made during the 3 0 days following his

termination which was "attributable" to his efforts. (R 10)
Paragraph 6 (R 10) sets forth provisions for paying a "draw against
future commissions." It states (emphasis added):
6.
DRAW:
Employee will be paid
commissions according to the following

a draw against
schedule:

Davs Following Employment

Draw

1 through 6 0 days
61 through 9 0 days
91 days on

$2,800 per month
$2,200 per month
$ 1 , 5 0 0 per month

future

From "91 days o n " the draw amount is $1500 per month or $750 every
pay period. Paragraph 6 further provides:
8

"If commissions earned do not equal the draw per month as
outlined above, Employer shall add that amount necessary to cause
Employee's gross pay to equal the monthly amount shown, such
amount to be considered a draw against future commissions." (R
10 Employment Agreement 1 6. Emphasis added.)

There is no contingency or ambiguity regarding the Employer's
obligation to pay the employee, at a minimum, this gross pay each pay
period. While the Employer can recapture the "draw" in certain
circumstances, the Agreement never permits the employer to pay the
employee less that the "gross pay" defined in Paragraph 6. There is no
suggestion that an employee might arrive at pay-day and find that he gets
$0 dollars in his envelope. There is, no where, any mention of paying an
employee minimum wage for some particular two weeks of work.
Moreover, this contract is not ambiguous.

This is an integral

contract. All the provisions regarding wages-commissions, draw, gross
pay, and recapture of draw from commissions-are consistent with one
another. While no provisions exist for paying less than the minimum
"gross pay," the contract does provide for the Employer to recapture
"draw" in particular circumstances.

When commissions earned rise

above a certain level ($2500 per month) and a "draw balance" exists, any
commissions over $2500 will go to the Employer to pay off the
"outstanding draws." (R 10-11 Employment Agreement ^6)

After

9

termination, the Employer is required to pay commissions for 30 days.
However, if there are "any outstanding draws", they will be paid off in
total by any post-termination "commissions" before the ex-employee gets
any commission earned during the 30 days following termination. (R 10
Employment Agreement t 5 . D ; Addendum

B) In fact, the contract

obviously labels all pay as either "commissions" or "draw against future
commissions" to facilitate the recapture of the maximum total "draw"
amount when sales are made and commissions earned.
None of these provisions for paying back

"draw"

out

of

"commissions" earned suggests any ambiguity in the employer's
obligation to pay the "gross pay" provided for in Paragraph 6 each and
every pay day.
C.

Undisputed

Facts and Law are Consistent

with the

Interpretation that ACT Owed Mr. Shuster Gross Pay of $750.
During the entire term of employment (except for the last pay day),
ACT behaved consistently with this plain meaning of the contract. Each
pay day for seven months ACT paid Mr. Shuster the "gross pay" amount.
(R 149 Findings 1 3, in Addendum K)
However, on Mr. Shuster's final pay day, ACT's ignored the "gross
pay" provision and paid Mr. Shuster no wages whatsoever since he had
not closed any sales during his final two weeks of full-time labor for ACT.
10

(R 3 Complaint 1 10, R 15 Complaint Exhibit C; in Addendum B. R 20
Answer *[ 3; in Addendum C). ACT argues that this is sensible for the
final pay period. But this interpretation is unconscionable. It would make
the wages owed an employee entirely dependent upon the date when
employment ended. If the employee resigned the day after "pay day," he
would have received the "gross pay" and he would have been fully
compensated. If, as in this case, the employment terminated the day the
pay period ended, the employer might obtain two weeks of free labor.
Surely a contract cannot set up such a "lottery" for wages. Since this
employment contract could be terminated with no notice (R 12
Agreement 1 1 3 ; Add. B), there must be a fixed wage owed no matter
which day in the month the employment ends.
ACT's initial position (that the contract required no payment of any
wages to Mr. Shuster) was also illegal. If an employee works full-time, for
two weeks, at his employer's offices under his employer's direction the
employer must pay him at least minimum wage. Both the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Utah Minimum Wage Act and related
regulations require employers to pay their employees at least minimum
wage for their work. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 206; Utah Code Ann. § 34-40101 et. seq.; and U.C.A. R572-1-3. See also Pierce v. Anagnostakis,
394 P.2d 74, 75-76 (Utah, 1964) (Even though waitress agreed to work
11

for "tips" only she was entitled to minimum wage under Utah statute).
There is an exception to minimum wage law for "outside sales persons"
which is irrelevant to this case.3 This exception makes common sense,
as the employer will not be able to oversee an "outside sales person,"
and will not be certain how many hours he devotes to the employer's
business. However, Mr. Shuster was not an "outside sales person" but
was contractually obligated to "devote all his time and efforts during
normal business hours of Employer to the performance and duties on
behalf of Employer." (R 8 Agreement 1 4; Add. B) And he did so. (R 149
Findings \ 2; Add. K). He worked at ACT's offices and called customers
by telephone, demonstrated products by modem, mailed solicitations and
developed marketing plans, all at ACT's business office.

(R 118-121

Shuster Affidavit 1 6-9, 12; Add. H). For such work for ACT, at ACT's
offices, ACT was required to pay Mr. Shuster at least minimum wage.
In Mr. Shuster's second written demand for payment, he referenced
minimum wage law. (R 16 Complaint Exhibit D; Add. B). After that, ACT
sent him minimum wage. (R 3 Complaint 1 1 1 & 12 and R 17 Complaint

3

The exception to minimum wage law for "outside sales persons" is
irrelevant to this case as it was contractually required and factually undisputed
that Mr. Shuster worked full-time at ACT's place of business. Since he was not
"customarily and regularly engaged away from his employer's place or places
of business" he was, under minimum wage law, an "inside salesman." 29
C.F.R. § 541.5(a). See 29 U.S.C.A. § 213 and Utah Code Ann. § 34-40-104.
12

Exhibit E; Add. B.

R 20 Answer S 3; Add. C).

There is nothing

whatsoever in the Employment Agreement regarding minimum wage.
D. ACT's Arguments are Unpersuasive.
ACT argues that it is illogical to pay a worker something called
"pre-paid commissions" if he "no longer calls on potential customers,
therefore, there is no way he can earn additional commissions." (Br. 10)
ACT again ignores the plain language of the contract. For thirty days
following

termination

COMMISSIONS.
There

the

employee

CAN

EARN

ADDITIONAL

(See R 10 Employment Agreement 1 5D; Add. B).

is nothing

illogical

about

paying

"draws

against

future

commissions" to an employee who is leaving the job but yet might earn
additional commissions during the 30 days after his termination.
Even if the contract didn't have the provision for earning
commissions after termination, it would be completely logical to interpret
the provisions in Paragraph 6 for paying a set "gross pay" each month in
a legal manner.
Today ACT's other argument focuses upon a word count. ACT
contends that the Agreement "uses the word 'commissions' 19 times,
the words 'draw against future commissions' once and 'commissionable'
6 times." (Br. 9). By force of numbers, all ACT had to pay Mr. Shuster
was "commissions."
13

Word counts are not a respected way to interpret contracts.4
Rather "it is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted so as to
harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, which terms should be
given effect if it is possible to do so." LDS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins.
Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah, 1988). Here, when one reads all the
words-including the provisions for paying "gross pay" in f

6-the

contract is integral, unambiguous, and legal.
Moreover, ACT's word-count argument that "commissions" were
all that was owed would render the Employment Agreement patently
illegal in failing to require even minimum wage. Presumably this Court
should ignore that illegality. Presumably, this Court should enforce such
an illegal contract since Mr. Shuster was, after all, finally paid minimum
wage.
This contract should not be considered ambiguous simply because
the defendant "ascribes a different meaning to it to suit his or her own
interests," Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross 849 P. 2d 1187,
1192 (Utah. App., 1993) citing Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818
P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991) cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah,

4

Moreover, ACT fails to count all the words. ACT ignores entirely the
words "gross pay" which are used one time, thus tying the usage rate of "draw
against future commissions." R 10 5 6; in Addendum B.
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1992). The only plain, sensible and legal interpretation of the contract
that ACT drafted and Mr. Shuster signed is that Mr. Shuster is entitled
to the "gross pay" amount (here $750) for his last two weeks in ACT's
employ.
II.

ACT'S

ARGUMENT

THAT

MR.

SHUSTER

WAS

PAID

"COMMISSIONS" AND NOT "WAGES" IS WRONG AND IMPROPER.
In its Brief, and for the first time, ACT reframes the issue as
"whether Mr. Shuster was a commissioned salesman or worked for
wages." (Statement of Issues, Br. 2) For the first time ACT argues that
statutes protecting wage earners do not apply to this case. (Br. 9, Point
III) Hence, ACT argues, the trial court's order of a civil penalty for ACT's
violation of the Utah Payment of Wages Act, and for payment of
plaintiff's attorneys fees under the Attorneys' Fees in Suits for Wages
Act should all be vacated; and this Court should "reverse the trial court's
ruling that granted Shuster's motion for summary judgment and grant
ACT's motion for summary judgment." (Br. 11)
ACT's position that these laws do not apply to it is not only wrong,
but frivolously wrong. ACT's attempt to raise this argument on appeal,
having never made any such argument to the trial court, is improper and
merits sanctions.
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A.

Whatever ACT Paid or Should Have Paid Mr. Shuster was

"Wages" under Utah Law.
While ACT

can draft

a contract that

calls

all

payments

"commissions" or "draws against future commissions," ACT's artful use
of language does not bind legislative bodies. "Wages" is a term of art
used in various laws to cover any and all payments made by "employers"
to "employees" for their work.
In the Utah Payment of Wages Act the Utah legislature set forth
what it meant by the term "wages;" and "wages" explicitly includes
"commission(s)":
§ 34-28-2 Definitions.
As used in this chapter:. . . .
(2) The word "wages" means all amounts due the employee for
labor or services, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a
time, task, piece, commission basis or other method of calculating
such amount, (emphasis added)
Thus, by the terms of this statute, whatever ACT was obligated to pay
Mr. Shuster-whether commissions or draw or minimum wage or gross
pay-is "wages" and is covered by the Payment of Wages statute.
It is worth noting that in various statutes the word "wages" is
regularly used to refer to whatever an "employer" pays an "employee."
Thus, the "Utah Minimum Wage Act" requires the payment of "minimum
wage for all private and public employees" with certain specific
16

exemptions.

Utah Code Ann. § 34-40-103(1 )(a) and §34-40-104.

(emphasis added).

The federal Fair Labor Standards Act section on

"Minimum Wage" similarly requires that "every employer shall pay to
each of his employees. . . wages at [particular] . . . rates" 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 2 0 6 . (emphasis added). Neither statute excludes "commissions" from
the definition of wages. 5 Similarly, the Utah law which makes wages a
preferred debt defines "wages" to include "all amounts due an employee
for labor or services, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a . .
. commission basis." Utah Code Ann. § 34-26-4.
The chapter of Utah law entitled Attorneys' Fees in Suits for Wages
applies "whenever a . . . employee shall have cause to bring suit for
wages earned and due according to the terms of his employment." Utah
Code Ann. § 3 4 - 2 7 - 1 . This one-section chapter does not itself contain
a definition of "wages."

However, this chapter was enacted together

with the preceding chapter (Wages a Preferred Debt § 34-26-1 et seq.)
and the succeeding chapter (Payment of Wages Act § 34-28-1 et. seq.);
and both of these chapters clearly define "wages" to include all payments

5

Both minimum wage statutes exempt employees who are "outside sales
persons" Utah Code Ann. § 34-40-104(1)(a) or "outside salesman" 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 2 1 3 from coverage.
Although many outside sales persons are paid
commissions, it does not logically follow that if an employee is paid a
commission he is an outside sales person.
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and specifically to include "commissions." 6

(See above.)

The only

sensible way to read the Attorneys' Fees chapter is to understand it as
providing a procedural remedy (attorney fees) for enforcing the rights to
wages set forth in the Payment of Wages Act which follows immediately.
And the one case on point, Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart Inc., 417
P.2d 7 6 1 , 765 (Utah, 1966) holds that a salesman who brought suit to
collect unpaid commissions was entitled to attorneys fees under the
(predecessor) statute.
B. The Utah Payment of Wages Act Applies to this Case
The Utah Payment of Wages Act (UPWA) requires that an employer
promptly pay an employee final wages after the employment relationship
ends. Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5. 7 "If the employer fails to do so upon
the employee's written demand for payment, the employee's wages
continue to accrue from the date of written demand until payment is
made, but no longer than sixty days." Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467,

6

Utah Code Ann. § 34-26-4 which defines "wages" was enacted by L.
1969 ch. 85 § 80; Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1 regarding attorneys fees was
enacted by L. 1969 ch. 85 § 8 1 ; and Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-2 which defines
wages under the UPWA was enacted by L. 1969 ch. 85 § 83.
7

The time periods vary slightly depending upon whether the employer
"separates" an employee from the payroll (24 hours) or the employee "resigns"
(72 hours). In this case, these differences are irrelevant, since ACT failed to
pay any wages for 45 days, violating the statute irrespective of which
subsection applies.
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469 (Utah, 1992)(dicta).8
The statute provides that the "wages of the employee shall
continue. . .at the same rate which the employee received at the time of
separation." Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5(2) (emphasis added).

The

statutory word "shall" indicates that this is a mandatory penalty. Indeed,
the trial court in Smith v. Batchelor saw this penalty as mandatory.9
ACT's brief erroneously and improperly argues:
"This section does not apply, however, to earnings of sales agents
employed on a commission basis. See paragraph (b) if that section,
(sic)" (Br. 9)

It is true that this section does not apply to a commissioned sales
agent "who has custody of accounts, money or goods of his principal if
the net amount due the agent is determined only after an audit or
verification of sales accounts, funds, or stocks." Utah Code Ann. § 348

In the trial court it was undisputed that ACT failed to pay any wages at
all to Mr. Shuster for 45 days. (R 66-67 Memorandum of Points and
Authorities Statement of Material Facts 1 8, relying upon R 5 Complaint 1 1 8
admitted in R 21 Answer \ 5.) It was similarly undisputed that Mr. Shuster
gave written demand for his wages on the day his employment ended, and that
he filed this action within 60 days of that date. (R 66-67 Memorandum's
Statement of Material Facts \ 8 and 10; in Addendum D ).
9

In Smith v. Batchelor, the trial court denied recovery under the federal Fair
Labor Standard's Act given the recovery awarded under the UWPA. The
Supreme Court reversed: "The trial court found. . . that equity prohibits both
state and federal recovery for the same violation. This is incorrect. Equity
follows the law. It cannot abridge an explicit statutory requirement." Smith v.
Batchelor at 4 7 1 .
19

28-5(1 )(b). But Mr. Shuster did not have custody of ACT's accounts,
money or goods on the date his employment ended. And there was no
audit needed to discover the commissions o w e d . In fact, the Complaint
specifically plead these facts:
1f 16. Defendant ACT has at all relevant times maintained and had
custody of all sales records necessary to determine commissions
and gross pay owed to Plaintiff Lee Shuster.
1 1 7 . On October 15, 1992 Defendant ACT knew that no sales
had occurred during the period from October 1 through October 14,
1992 and thus knew that no commissions were owed to Plaintiff
Lee Shuster at the time of separation from employment. (R 4-5
Complaint; in Addendum B)

And ACT's Answer specifically admitted to these facts:
1 5. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph sixteen,
seventeen and eighteen. (R 21 Answer; in Addendum C)

ACT improperly cites the law by quoting only a portion of the
statute. ACT improperly raises an argument which is not grounded in
fact or law, given the Complaint and Answer filed.
C. Utah Statute Mandates Payment of Attorneys' Fees in this Case
Utah statute provides for attorneys fees "whenever a . . . employee
shall have cause to bring suit for wages earned and due according to the
terms of his employment." Utah Code A n n . § 3 4 - 2 7 - 1 . If the court finds
"that the amount for which he has brought suit is justly due" then:
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"it shall be the duty of the court. . . to allow to the plaintiff a
reasonable attorneys' fee in addition to the amount found due for
wages, to be taxed as costs of suit." Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1.
(emphasis added)
Here again, this statute uses mandatory, not discretionary language. An
employee who prevails in a suit for wages must get attorneys' fees.
ACT's use of the terms "commissions" and "draw against future
commissions" does not make this law inapplicable. "Wages" as used in
this act includes any payment-whether salary or commissions-an
employer owes its employees.

The case on point is Bennett v.

Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc. 417 P.2d 7 6 1 , 765 (Utah, 1966). In
Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart Inc. a salesman was awarded
attorneys' fees under this act for proving that he was entitled to be paid
a certain amount in commissions. The Utah Supreme Court quoted the
definitional language10 of the next section on wages and held:
The fact that plaintiff was paid on a commission basis does not
preclude him from coverage under this section. Bennett at 765.
Not only do the plain words of the statutes establish that attorneys fees
are mandated in this case, but the only authority on point definitively hold

10

"Wages shall mean all amounts at which the labor or service rendered is
recompensed, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task piece,
commission basis or other methods of calculating such amount." Emphasis
added by Court. Bennett at 765. quoting then Section 34-10-3(b), U.C.A.
1953.
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that when an employee is paid "commissions" those are nevertheless
"wages" under the statute that allows him to collect attorneys fees when
he has to sue to collect his wages. ACT's argument has no support.
D. ACT's Argument that these Statutes Do Not Apply is Improper
Since No Such Argument was Ever Presented to the Trial Court.
ACT never previously raised any argument that either the Utah
Payment of Wages Act or the Attorneys7 Fees statutory provisions do not
apply.
Mr. Shuster raised and briefed the issue of civil penalties under the
UPWA in his Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in
support. (R 70-72 Pt. II, p.6-8; in Addendum D) ACT did not say one
word to contest this argument in its Response.(R 91-96; in Addendum E)
In Shuster's Reply Memorandum he confirmed that the issue as to the
penalty under the UPWA was undisputed:
III. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR CIVIL PENALTIES UNDER THE UTAH
PAYMENT OF WAGE ACT IS NOT DISPUTED.
Plaintiff's second cause of action is based upon ACT's
violation of the Utah Payment of Wages Act. The UPWA requires
prompt payment of wages at termination. This cause of action
does not depend upon the interpretation of the Employment
Agreement.11 If ACT owed Mr. Shuster any wages at all (even
"minimum wages") ACT violated the UPWA for paying nothing for

11

The amount of the civil penalty depends upon whether this Court finds
the plaintiff entitled to wages under the Agreement or entitled to minimum
wage.
22

45 days.
Defendant ACT's Response and Memorandum does not
controvert this point at all. Accordingly, this Court should order
judgment for the Plaintiff under Count II for ACT's violation of the
Utah Payment of Wage Act.
(R 114-115 Reply Memorandum; in Addendum G)

Even at oral argument ACT did not dispute the applicability of the
UPWA to this case. (R 245-246; in Addendum D ACT did argue that its
failure to pay Mr. Shuster anything at all for 45 days was not in "bad
faith." (R 245-246; Add. I) In response, Mr. Shuster urged not only that
the penalty was mandatory but that it was also equitable under all the
circumstances.12 Finally, at the hearing Judge Fuchs indicated his view
that the UPWA was mandatory and ACT's counsel seemed to concede
that point. (R 260-261; Add. I) The only argument made-regarding "bad
faith" and the reasonableness of penalties-does not hint at an argument
that the UPWA does not apply in this case.
Similarly, Shuster raised and briefed his entitlement to attorneys'
fees under the act in his Motion (R 62-63) and Memorandum (R 72-76 Pt.

12

When Mr. Shuster notified ACT that its actions violated minimum wage
law, he also informed ACT of the UPWA penalties and the Attorneys' Fees
provisions. However, in his letter Mr. Shuster offered to settle the entire
dispute ("to consider myself paid in full for all claims that could exist between
us") if ACT paid the contractual wages of $750 even at that late date. (R 16
Complaint Exhibit D; Add. B) Instead, ACT chose to send the minimum wage
amount (R 19 Complaint Exhibit E; Add. B), and Mr. Shuster did what he
promised in his letter-brought this action raising all available claims.
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III.; Add. D) Again, ACT's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment never addresses the applicability of the Attorneys' Fees statute
to this case. Nor did ACT raise any arguments as to attorneys' fees
during oral argument. (R 261-262; Add. D Moreover, when the trial court
entered its Memorandum Decision, Judge Fuchs specifically allowed ACT
an opportunity to challenge the attorneys' fees:
Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees as prayed for by the affidavit.
Defendant shall have 10 days to challenge the attorney fees and
request a hearing if appropriate. (R 141 -142 Memorandum Decision
p.2; in Addendum J)

ACT did not avail itself of the court's invitation to challenge attorneys'
fees at that timely point.
It is improper for ACT to raise and seek to dispute these legal
issues before this appellate court, having never raised them in the trial
court. "[I]t is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial court may
not be raised for the first time on appeal." Franklin Financial v. New
Empire Development Co., 659

P.2d

1040,

1044

(Utah,

1983)

(sufficiency of affidavit not challenged in trial court prior to summary
judgment). See also Ong International (USA) v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850
P.2d 447, 455 (Utah, 1993) (jury instruction). Even constitutional
challenges may not be presented on appeal if they were not "timely
presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling
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thereon." Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App.
1989) (equal protection challenge to jury selection). See also Espinal v.
Salt Lake City Board of Education, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990) (Utah
Constitution). "Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are
deemed waived, precluding [the Court of Appeals] from considering their
merits on appeal."

Salt Lake County v. Carlston at 655. (emphasis

added).
This Court has fully explained the rationale for such issue
preclusion: "To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must
timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the
court an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits." LeBaron & Assoc, v.
Rebel Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah App. 1991)--issue of
mitigation was not raised "to the level of consciousness . . . sufficient to
allow the trial judge to consider it." Id. Even "obliquely" raising an issue
in the complaint or answer is not sufficient to preserve it for appeal
where the issue was not argued and the trial court was not asked to rule
on the issue. Id. citing James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-2 (Utah
App. 1987) (issue of equitable mortgage "obliquely raised" in complaint,
but trial court made no ruling and plaintiff did not object or provide legal
authority on issue, thus not properly before Court on Appeal); and Turtle
Management Inc. v. Haggis Management Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah,
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1982) (issue of covenant not to compete's legality raised in answer, but
"no argument was made to the district court on this issue" and trial court
had no opportunity to make findings or rulings on issue, thus it was not
properly before Utah Supreme Court on appeal.)
Here ACT's arguments (that the Utah Payment of Wage Act and
the Attorneys' Fees statute do not apply to this case) were never made,
argued, briefed or even hinted at in the trial court. The trial judge never
had any opportunity to consider and to rule on them. ACT should not
now be permitted to raise these arguments in the Court of Appeals. They
have not been preserved for appeal. Making them now ignores the legal
standards for appeals and is frivolous. ACT should be sanctioned.
III.

IF THIS COURT AFFIRMS THE JUDGMENT FOR SHUSTER, IT

SHOULD REMAND THE CASE FOR CALCULATION OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES FOR THIS APPEAL.
Utah statute mandates that an employee be allowed "reasonable
attorneys fees" for any action brought to collect wages justly due.
A. Attorneys' Fees Are A Matter of Right Under the Statute.
As set forth above, Utah statute provides for attorneys fees in suits
for wages. Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1. If the court finds "that the
amount" for which Mr. Shuster has brought suit "is justly due" then:
"it shall be the duty of the court. . . to allow to the plaintiff a
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reasonable attorneys' tee in addition to the amount found due for
wages, to be taxed as costs of suit." Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1.
(emphasis added)
The public policy behind enforcement of wage laws supports this
mandatory award of attorneys' fees, even if they are large in comparison
with the wages recovered:
As a general rule, the amounts recoverable under the FLSA and the
UPWA are so small that attorney fees will exceed any potential
recovery. Hence, unless an award of attorney fees is available,
workers would be unable to enforce their rights under these
statutes. Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d at 474 (J. Stewart,
concurring and dissenting).
The general rule in awarding attorneys' fees is consistent with this
principle. The legal work necessary to enforce a contract for a small
amount may be just as time-consuming as enforcing a contract for a large
amount:
Although the amount in controversy can be a factor in determining
a reasonable fee, care should be used in putting much reliance on
this factor. It is a simple fact in a lawyer's life that it takes about
the same amount of time to collect a note in the amount of $1000
as it takes to collect a note for $100,000." Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah App., 1988).

Similarly, the legal work necessary to defend a small judgment on appeal
will relate more to the maneuvers and arguments made by the appellant
than it will to the dollar amount of the judgment.
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B. Where Attorneys' Fees are Mandated, they Should Be Awarded
to a Successful Appellee for Work on Appeal.
If this Court affirms the Circuit Court's judgment, it should order
that the appellee's attorneys' fees in defending the Judgment through
appeal be paid by the appellant-defendant ACT. Since 1980 it has been
the rule of law in Utah that if attorneys' fees are mandated, this should
include "attorneys' fees incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well
as at trial." Management Services v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d
406, 409 (Utah, 1980). 13 In that case the parties had signed a contract
which provided for attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in an action to
enforce the contract. The Utah Supreme Court explained the principle
behind the new rule of law it adopted:
"The purpose of a provision for attorney's fees is to indemnify the
creditor or the prevailing party against the necessity of paying an
attorney's fee and to enable him to recover the full amount of the
obligation. . . . If plaintiff is required to defend its position on
appeal at its own expense plaintiff's rights under the contract are
thereby diminished, at 409 quoting Zambruk v. Per/mutter Third
General Builders, Inc., 510 P.2d 472 (Colo.App. 1973).

This principle and policy applies equally in this case where state law
provides for attorneys' fees. The public policy behind allowing a worker

13

On this point this case overruled Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate &
Investment Co., 3 Utah 2d 1 2 1 , 279 P.2d 709 (1955) and Downey State Bank
v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 556 P.2d 1273 (Utah, 1976).
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to recover attorneys' fees for successfully defending a wage claim on
appeal is as strong (if not stronger) than the principle of enforcing parties7
contracts14 as to attorneys7 fees.
The general rule of law in Utah regarding attorneys fees on appeal
is that "attorneys fees, when awarded as allowed by law, are awarded
as a matter of legal right." (emphasis added)

Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694

P.2d 6 2 2 , 625 (Utah, 1989) This Court has enunciated the "general rule"
in these word:
[W]hen a party who received attorney fees below prevails on
appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on
appeal. Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193,
1197 (Utah App. 1991)

In that case this Court recognized that fees for appeal were properly
awarded based not only upon contractual provisions, but also "when fees

14

Since the landmark decision of Management Services v. Development
Associates, supra there have been numerous cases in which the Utah Supreme
Court and this Court have affirmed that holding where the attorneys fees were
based upon contractual provisions. See Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 6 9 2 ,
695 (Utah, 1982) (purchasers of subdivision lot rely upon Earnest Money
Agreement); Bushnell Real Estate Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah, 1983)
(promissory note); Cabrera v. Cottrell, 6 9 4 P.2d 6 2 2 , 625 (Utah, 1985)
(uniform sales contract); G.G.A. Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 8 4 1 , 846 (Utah
App. 1989) (lessee enforcing right to first refusal); Saunders v. Sharp, 8 4 0 P.2d
7 9 6 , 8 0 9 - 8 1 0 (Utah App. 1992) (purchasers of property seeking specific
performance); Cobabe v. Crawford, 7 8 0 P.2d 834, 8 3 6 (Utah App. 1989)
(attorneys fees to defendants in contract action after dismissal with prejudice).
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in a divorce were awarded below to the party who then prevailed on
appeal" citing Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 1990), and
"where basis for award of fees was mechanic's lien statute" citing
Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah App. 1989). Utah Dept.
of Social Services v. Adams at 1197.
In this case attorneys' fees are based upon a statute which
mandates15 the award of those fees to a wage earner who proves he
was entitled to the wages claimed. The award of attorneys fees on
appeal should be a matter of "legal right."
Whenever a successful appellee is entitled to attorneys' fees for
defending the Judgment, the proper remedy is for this Court to remand
the case for the trial court to award reasonable fees for the appeal.
Management Services v. Development Associated, 617 P.2d 406, 109
(Utah, 1980); GGA Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 8 4 1 , 847 (Utah App.
1989); Cobabe v. Crawford. 780 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1989).

15

Certain of the opinions dealing with attorneys fees under a contract have,
in dicta, distinguished between contractual cases in which attorneys fees were
a matter of right and cases of "applying a statute which allows the
discretionary award of such fees." Saunders v. Sharp, supra at 809, Cobabe v.
Crawford, supra at 836, both quoting Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d
216, 226 (5th Cir. 1975). This dicta in not relevant to this case since the
statutory award of fees to an employee enforcing a wage claim is NOT
discretionary, but mandatory.
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IV. APPELLANT ACT AND ITS COUNSEL SHOULD BE SANCTIONED FOR
VIOLATION OF RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE.
This Court should sanction appellant ACT and its counsel for its
failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, for its improper
and erroneous statements of facts (both in its Brief and its Docketing
Statement) and for its attempt to raise issues in its brief which have not
been preserved for appeal and which are patently frivolous.
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that this
Court "shall award just damages" for a "frivolous appeal, . . . or other
paper. . . . not grounded in fact, nor warranted by existing law

or

. . . interposed for purpose of delay." Utah R. App. Pro. 33 (a) and (b).
A. The Docketing Statement Violated Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure by Failing to Include Necessary Attachments
and by Failing to State the Standard of Review.
ACT failed to include as "necessary attachments" to its Docketing
Statement the trial court's Memorandum Decision and its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, although these documents clearly fell within the
category of "any opinion or findings" required to be attached. Rule 9(d)(2)
Utah R. App. P. The appellee Shuster pointed out this failure in his Motion
for Summary Disposition, Dismissal and Sanctions. Then Appellant ACT
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filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Docketing Statement (August
1) and appellee Shuster filed a Response asking that all corrections--not
just those admitted to in the Motion-be made. (August 4). Before ACT's
Motion was acted upon, ACT filed an Amended Docketing Statement
(August 4). As noted by this Court, that Amended Docketing Statement
"still does not include the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law."
Order August 15, 1994. This Court ordered that ACT have:
leave to amend the Docketing Statement. . . to include the addition
of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated
March 2 1 , 1994 if such a document exists and to state the
applicable standard of review. (Order August 15, 1994).
Ultimately ACT did file all these "necessary attachments" and did state
the standard of review. But getting this accomplished required additional
and unnecessary work by appellee and by this Court.
Even if ACT's failure to attach the proper documents was the result
of negligence or inadvertence, it is nevertheless sanctionable. In Taylor
v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171-172 (Utah App. 1989) this Court
held that attaching the wrong document-a will-to a complaint violated
Rule 11 Utah R. Civ. P. and merited sanctions. The court explained that
reasonable inquiry would have resulted in the proper document being
attached. Here, too, a reasonable inquiry by ACT's counsel would have
resulted in the proper documents being attached the first time. In Taylor
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the court based its holding upon the further fact that plaintiff's error
caused the opponent to incur legal costs.

Here, too, damages are

appropriate since ACT's failure to comply w i t h Rule 9 the first time
caused appellee and this Court additional legal work.
B. ACT's "Statement of Facts" is Not "Grounded in Fact" and
Merits Sanctions.
Both in its Docketing Statement and in its Brief, ACT has included
"facts" which were not "material" to the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the plaintiff. Moreover, many of these alleged "facts" were
not ever plead or averred by anyone in the trial court. The inclusion of
these alleged "facts" is not grounded in fact or law. Where the evidence
is "mischaracterized and misstated" to the appellate court, sanctions are
appropriate. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 3 9 5 , 397 (Utah App. 1987).
ACT falsely sets forth the following in its Brief:
Statement of Facts
The facts material to the issue presented in this appeal are: . . . .
2. 8 0 % percent of ACT's revenues come from new sales . . . .
3. ACT is only able to stay in business by seeking out and selling
its products to new customers. (Brief p. 4)
These same "facts" were set forth in ACT's Docketing Statement,
Statement of Fact p. 2. 1 6 These "facts" were not alleged in the Affidavit

16

The misstatements of " f a c t s " material to the issues on appeal were made
in the original, the Amended, and the Second Amended Docketing Statement.
33

of ACT's president (R 97-98; Add. F), were not reproduced in the
contract, and were disputed (in part) by Mr. Shuster's Affidavit (R 119120 1 10; Add. H).

More significantly, they formed no basis for the

Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiff, so they are
clearly not "facts material to the issue presented in this appeal." Thus,
these allegations are inappropriately cited as "facts" in both the Brief and
the Docketing Statement.
Second, ACT's "Statement of Facts" includes the following
allegations which were disputed in part by plaintiff and which, moreover,
were not material to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment:
1. ACT is in the business of selling computer hardware and
accounting software to beer, wine, soda and bottled water
distributors throughout the United States. . . .
4. On March 2, 1992 ACT hired Shuster as a commissioned
salesman to call on potential new customers and attempt to sell
ACT's products to them. (Brief p. 4-5)

These same "facts" were set forth in the Docketing Statement,
Statement of Fact -- Introduction p. 2. While the contract sets forth the
nature of the business (R 8), it also allowed ACT to assign Mr. Shuster
to particular duties within that business.17

The Affidavit of ACT's

17

The contract reads in relevant part: "Employer reserves the right to
modify the . . . nature or type of prospective clients from whom Employee shall
solicit business." R 8 Employment Agreement 1 1; Add. B.
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president said nothing about what Mr. Shuster was hired to sell (R 97-98;
Add. F); and Mr. Shuster's Affidavit (R 118 1 4; Add. H) and Reply
Memorandum (R 109; Add. G) asserted that his duties were limited as
permitted by the contract.18 Moreover, these disputed "facts" formed no
basis for the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiff.
Thus they, too, were inappropriately cited as "facts" to the Court of
Appeals.
Thirdly, ACT's Statement of Facts sets forth the following "facts"
which ACT's president had averred in support of ACT's Motion for
Summary Judgment, but which plaintiff Shuster had disputed:
9. During the period of Shuster's employment with ACT, 8 1/2
months, he earned commissions of $ 1,831.30 but received prepaid
commissions of $11,632.86. (Brief p. 5)
These same "facts" are set forth as "facts" in the Docketing Statement
p. 3. Although these "facts" were alleged by ACT's President, they were
disputed by Plaintiff (R 120 Affidavit 1 1 1 ; Add. H). Moreover, these
disputed facts were irrelevant to plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R 109 Reply Memorandum; Add. G).
None of the "facts" set forth above were found by the trial court.
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The employee, Mr Shuster, was hired to sell only a portion of ACT's
products to on certain clients (software and hardware to bottled water
distributors) and in only certain states.
35

These were not "facts" relied upon by the trial court in finding that the
contract was unambiguous, in interpreting that contract, or in granting
the plaintiff summary judgment. Therefore, they are not facts "material"
to this appeal. Thus, they are improperly included as "facts" in ACT's
Brief and in ACT's Docketing Statement.
What these allegations are is parole evidence ACT would like to
present in a trial of this case. IF the contract is ambiguous, then ACT
should have its chance to present parole evidence about the operation of
its business and the plaintiff's conduct. IF the contract is ambiguous,
then the plaintiff, too, should have an opportunity to present evidence
about ACT's business and ACT's conduct toward him. But if (as the trial
court found) the contract is unambiguous; then parole evidence should
not be considered. ACT should not be permitted to surreptitiously present
parole evidence on appeal when the only issue on appeal is whether the
contract is unambiguous and what that contract says.
ACT's improper attempts to present evidence in this case may tend
to confuse the case. The likelihood is that these misstatements of law
were made for the purposes of obfuscation and delay. This Court should
award "just damages" for a this frivolous and improper statements of
"fact" which are "not grounded in fact," are improper under the legal
standard for reviewing the judgment of the trial court, and were most
36

probably interposed to confuse of delay the resolution of this case. Rule
33 (a) and (b), Utah R. App. Pro.
C. ACT's Brief Presents Arguments and Seeks Relief Not Grounded
in Law Because the issues were Not Raised before the Trial Court,
the Arguments are Patently Frivolous, and the Relief is Procedurally
Unavailable.
ACT's arguments that the Utah Payment of Wages ACT (UPWA)
and the Attorneys Fees Act do not apply because Mr. Shuster was paid
"commissions" and not "wages" are patently erroneous and frivolous.
(See II.A. B. and C. supra). These arguments are further "not grounded
in law" because they were never raised before the trial court and are
improperly made for the first time on appeal. (See II. D. supra)
The relief ACT seeks-vacate the Judgment for Shuster and grant
Summary Judgment for ACT-is similarly not grounded in law for two
reasons.

First, ACT has waived any objection to a judgment for Mr.

Shuster under the UPWA.

In addition, ACT's Motion for Summary

Judgment included as "material facts" matters that were disputed by Mr.
Shuster (R 117-129 Affidavit; Add. H). (There alleged facts continue to
be presented by ACT as "material facts" in this appeal. (See IV.B. supra.)
Therefore, the only appropriate remedy for ACT to seek on appeal is to
vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings (a trial)
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before the trial court.
This panoply of frivolous legal maneuvers merits sanctions under
Rule 33. Utah R. App. Pro. The Utah Supreme Court found that Rule 33
was violated and sanctions appropriate when there was "a complete lack
of merit" to a cause of action. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah,
1990).

In that case the defendant dentist had obtained summary

judgment in a malpractice action by presenting affidavits denying his
treatment caused plaintiff's injuries and averring his treatment met the
standard of care.

Plaintiff-appellant had failed to present affidavits

controverting those of appellee. Instead, she appealed. That appeal, like
ACT's arguments on the UPWA and on the Attorneys' Fees Act, lacked
any legal merit.
This Court made clear that a "frivolous" appeal under Rule 33 does
not require a showing of bad faith. O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310
(Utah App. 1987).

Rather, an appeal is "frivolous" if it has "no

reasonable legal or factual basis."Id. ACT's arguments regarding the
UPWA and Attorneys Fees Act are totally frivolous under this standard.
Rules sanctioning frivolous pleadings do "not impose a duty to do perfect
or exhaustive research. The appropriate standard is whether the research
was objectively reasonable under all the circumstances."

Barnard v.

Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah, 1992) (Sanctions inappropriate
38

under Rule 11 Utah R.Civ.Pro.)

Here

ACT's

research

seems

nonexistent. ACT did not even read the complete statute before arguing
in its brief that the UWPA and the Attorneys Fees Act do not apply to
employees who are paid commissions. (See II.A-C above). ACT similarly
did not read Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mark Inc., 417 P. 2d 7 6 1 , 765
(Utah, 1966), the case which holds salesmen are entitled to rely upon the
Attorneys' Fees Act in collecting commissions wrongly withheld them.
ACT did not read or ignored the complete language of the statute, despite
the fact that it was set forth and explained in Plaintiff's Memorandum (R
70-71, fn. 6; Add. D). ACT ignored the case on point despite the fact
that it, too, was cited in appellee's Memorandum to the trial court. (R 72;
Add. D) Such absence of research is unreasonable under any set for
circumstances.
An "appeal brought for delay is one marked by dilatory conduct or
conduct designed to mislead the court and which benefits only the
appellant." O'Brien v. Bush, at 310. The omission of the trial court's
Order and Findings both delays and misleads the court.

The

misstatement of facts misleads the court. The attempt to raise issues on
appeal that were never raised before the trial court improperly delays the
case and misleads the court. The prayer for relief that is unavailable
misleads the court.

39

"[W]hen there is no basis for the argument presented and when the
evidence or law is mischaracterized and misstated" sanctions are
appropriate. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App. 1987). In
this case, too, the number of statements and arguments made which
have no basis in fact or law should lead this Court to sanction the
appellant ACT and ACT's counsel.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellee Lee Shuster asks this
Court to affirm the Judgment of the Circuit Court, to award the appellee
costs pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to
remand the case to the trial court for the calculation of reasonable
attorneys' fees in defending the Judgment, to find the appellant and its
counsel to have violated Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
and to order just damages pursuant to Rule 33 beyond the attorneys' fees
otherwise provided for by statute.

Respectfully submitted,
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This is to certify that two copies of the Brief of Appellee were served
on Defendant/Appellant's counsel Thomas R. Blonquist by delivering them
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Thomas R. Blonquist (0369)
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
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CHAPTER 27
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN SUITS FOR WAGES
Section
34-27-1.

UTAH CODE

Reasonable amount — Taxed as costs.

34-27-1. Reasonable amount — Taxed as costs.
Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, servant, or other employee shall have cause to bring suit
for wages earned and due according to the terms of
his employment and shall establish by the decision of
the court that the amount for which he has brought
suit is justly due, and that a demand has been made
in writing at least fifteen days before suit was
brought for a sum not to exceed the amount so found
due, then it shall be the duty of the court before
which the case shall be tried to allow to the plaintiff a
reasonable attorneys' fee in addition to the amount
found due for wages, to be taxed as costs of suit. 1969

CHAPTER 28
PAYMENT OF WAGES

34-28-L

Public and certain other employments
excepted.
None of the provisions of this chapter shall apply to
the state, or to any county, incorporated city or town,
or other political subdivision, or to employers and employees engaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticultural or horticultural pursuits or to stock or poultry
raising, or to household domestic service, or to any
other employment where an agreement exists between employer and employee providing for different
terms of payment, except the provisions of Section
34-28-5 shall apply to employers or employees engaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticultural, horticultural or stock or poultry raising.
1973
34-28-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) The word "employer" includes every person, firm, partnership, association, corporation,
receiver or other officer of a court of this state,
and any agent or officer of any of the above-mentioned classes, employing any person in this
state.
(2) The word "wages" means all amounts due
the employee for labor or services, whether the
amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task,
piece, commission basis or other method of calculating such amount.
1969

34-28-5. Separation from payroll — Resignation
— Cessation because of industrial dispute.
(1) (a) Whenever an employer separates an employee from his payroll the unpaid wages of the
employee become due immediately, and the employer shall pay the wages to the employee
within 24 hours of the time of separation at the
specified place of payment.
(b) This section does not apply to the earnings
of a sales agent employed on a commission basis
who has custody of accounts, money, or goods of
his principal if the net amount due the agent is
determined only after an audit or verification of
sales, accounts, funds, or stocks.
(2) In case of failure to pay wages due an employee
within 24 hours of written demand, the wages of the
employee shall continue from the date of demand
until paid, but in no event to exceed 60 days, at the
same rate which the employee received at the time of
separation. The employee may recover the penalty
thus accruing to him in a civil action. This action
must be commenced within 60 days from the date of
separation. Any employee who has not made a written demand for payment is not entitled to any penalty
under this subsection.
(3) If an employee does not have a written contract
for a definite period and resigns his employment, the
wages earned become due and payable not later than
72 hours after the resignation, unless the employee
gave 72 hours previous notice of his intention to resign, in which case the employee shall receive his
wages at the specified place of payment at the time of
resignation.
(4) If work ceases as the result of an industrial dispute, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of this
cessation become due and payable at the next regular
payday, as provided in Section 34-28-3, including,
without abatement or reduction, all amounts due all
persons whose work has been suspended as a result of
the industrial dispute, together with any deposit or
other guaranty held by the employer for the faithful
performance of the duties of the employment.
IW9

UTAH CODE
34-40-101. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Utah Minimum
Wage Act."

1990

34-40-102. Definitions.
(1) This chapter and the terms used in it, including
the computation of wages, shall be interpreted consistently with 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq., the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, as amended, to the extent that
act relates to the payment of a minimum wage.
(2) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Commission" means the Industrial Commission of Utah.
(b) "Minimum wage" means the state minimum hourly wage for adult employees as established under this chapter, unless the context
clearly indicates otherwise.
1990
34-40-103.

M i n i m u m w a g e — C o m m i s s i o n to rev i e w , modify m i n i m u m w a g e .

(1) (a) The minimum wage for all private and public employees within the state shall be $3.35 per
hour.
(b) Effective April 1, 1990, the minimum wage
shall be $3.80 per hour.
(2) (a) Subsequent to July 1, 1990, the commission
may by rule establish the minimum wage or
wages as provided in this chapter which may be
paid to employees in public and private employment within the state.
(b) The minimum wage, as established by the
commission, may not exceed the federal minimum wage as provided in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et
seq., the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
amended, in effect at the time of implementation
of this section.
(c) The commission:
(i) may review the minimum wage at any
time;
(it) shall review the minimum wage at
least every three years; and
(iii) shall review the minimum wage
whenever the federal minimum wage is
changed.
(3) The commission may provide for separate minimum hourly wages for minors.
1990
34-40-104. E x e m p t i o n s .
(1) The minimum wage established in this chapter
does not apply to any employee who is entitled to a
minimum wage as provided in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et
seq., the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
amended. In addition, the minimum wage does not
apply to the following:
(a) outside sales persons;

UNITED STATES CODE
ANNOTATED
Title 2 9
Labor
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS

§ 206. Minimum wage
(a) Employees engaged in commerce; home workers in Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands;
employees in American Samoa; seamen on American vessels; agricultural employees

Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at the
Mowing rates:
(1) except as otherwise provided in this section, not less than $3.35 an hour
during the period ending March 31, 1990, not less than $3.80 an hour during the
year beginning April 1, 1990, and not less than $4.25 an hour after March 31, 1991;

$ 213. Exemptions
(a) The provisions of section 206 (except subsection (d) in the case of paragraph (1) of
this subsection) and section 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to—
(1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity (including any employee employed in the capacity of academic
administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools), or in the
capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited from time to
time by regulations of the Secretary, subject to the provisions of subchapter II of
chapter 5 of Title 5, except that an employee of a retail or service establishment
shall not be excluded from the definition of employee employed in a bona fide
executive or administrative capacity because of the number of hours in his workweek which he devotes to activities not directly or closely related to the performance of executive or administrative activities, if less than 40 per centum of his
hours worked in the workweek are devoted to such activities); or

29 Crt Ch. V (7-1-93 Edition)

§ 541.5 Outside salesman.

The term employee employed * • • in
the capacity of outside salesman in
section 13(aXl) of the Act shall mean
any employee:
(a) Who is employed for the purpose
of and who is customarily and regularly engaged away from his employer's
place or places of business in:
(1) Making sales within the meaning
of section 3(k) of the Act, or
(2) Obtaining orders or contracts for
services or for the use of facilities for
which a consideration will be paid by
the client or customer; and
(b) Whose hours of work of a nature
other than that described in paragraph (a)(1) or (2) of this section do
not exceed 20 percent of the hours
worked in the workweek by nonexempt employees of the employer: Provided, That work performed incidental
to and in conjunction with the employee's own outside sales or solicitations, including incidental deliveries
and collections, shall not be regarded
as nonexempt work.

UTAH
ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE
R572-1-3. Coverage.
A. All employers employing workers in the State of
Utah, except those exempted by Section 34-40-104,
shall pay the established minimum hourly wage of
$4.25 for all hours employed, effective April 1, 1991.
B. As per Sections 34-23-301 and 34-40-103, a
minor employee may not be paid less than 85% of the
state minimum hourly wage in effect for adult employees as delineated in R572-1-3(A).
C. Any employer claiming exemption under Subsection 34-40-104(1 )<j) shall provide to the Division a
statistical report of the average wage paid within 60
days of the end of the regular operating season. The
Division may, upon notice, perform an on-site inspection to verify the report in accordance with Sections
34-40-201 and 34-40-203.
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LINDA FAYE SMITH, #4460
Attorney for Plaintiff
C/O University of Utah
College of Law
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
Telephone: 581-4077
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

LEE K. SHUSTER,

*
*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

COMPLAINT

*
*

APPLIED COMPUTER TECHNIQUES
INC.

Defendant.

Plaintiff

*
*

Civil No. Y ^ a o / ^ f S " ^

*
*

Judge

rac^x-

Lee K. Shuster complains of Defendant Applied

Computer Techniques, Inc. ("ACT") as follows:
JURISDICTION AND PARTIES
1. Plaintiff Lee K. Shuster is an individual residing in Salt
Lake County, Utah.
2.

Defendant Applied Computer Techniques, Inc. (hereinafter

"ACT") is a corporation incorporated in the state of Utah, with its
1

principal place of business at 772 East 3300 South, Suite 200, Salt
Lake City, in Salt Lake County, Utah,
3.

The amount claimed is less than $10,000, exclusive of

costs.
FACTS
4.
2,

On or about February 11, 1992 and again on or about March

1992 Plaintiff

Lee K. Shuster entered

into an Employment

Agreement with Defendant Applied Computer Techniques, Inc., (ACT)
which Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated
herein.
5.

From February 26, 1992 through October 14, 1992 Plaintiff

Lee Shuster worked pursuant to said Employment Agreement, "devoting
all of his time and energy during normal business hours" to ACT's
business (Agreement paragraph 4).
6. From approximately February 26, 1992 through September 30,
1992 Defendant ACT paid Plaintiff Lee Shuster the "gross pay"
provided for under Paragraph 6 of said Employment Agreement, since
the commissions earned never exceeded such "gross pay."
7.

On or about October 14, 1992 Defendant ACT, through its

President Vaughn Christensen, terminated the Employment Agreement
with Plaintiff Lee K. Shuster.
8.

On or about October 14, 1992 Defendant ACT offered

Plaintiff Lee Shuster a new contract for employment, including a
2

provision to pay Plaintiff on a straight commission basis.
9.

On October 15, 1992 Plaintiff Lee Shuster confirmed ACT'S

termination of the Employment Agreement, declined to enter into a
new contract for compensation on a straight commission basis, and
gave written demand to ACT for payment of wages for his all work
from October 1 through October 14, 1992. Said response and written
demand is attached as Exhibit "B".
10.

On or about October 19, 1992 Defendant ACT failed and

refused to make any payment to Plaintiff Lee Shuster for work
performed from October 1 through October 14, 1992, on the ground
that "no commissions were earned" during that period. ACT's letter
refusing to pay Plaintiff any wages is attached as Exhibit "C".
11. On or about November 19, 1992 Plaintiff Lee Shuster again
made written request for payment of the wages owed, requested
"gross pay" under the Employment Agreement (Paragraph 6) in the
amount of $750.00, and informed Defendant ACT that its failure and
refusal to pay any wages not only violated the Agreement, but
violated state and federal minimum wage law and Utah Code Ann. §
34-28-5

(Supp. 1992).

Plaintiff's second written request is

attached as Exhibit "D".
12. On or about December 1, 1992 Defendant ACT paid Plaintiff
minimum wage for 80 hours of work from October 1 to October 14,
1992, totalling $340; and again failed and refused to pay the
3

"gross pay" due under paragraph 6 of the Employment Agreement.
ACT's letter admitting Plaintiff's entitlement to minimum wage and
refusing to pay the "gross pay" under the Agreement is attached as
Exhibit "E."

COUNT I
13.
Lee

On or about October 15, 1992 Defendant ACT owed P l a i n t i f f

Shuster

"gross

pay"

Employment Agreement,
t h r o u g h October 1 4 ,
14.
to

for

of

$750.00

the

under

two weeks of

Paragraph

6 of

the

work from October

1

1992.

Defendant ACT's r e f u s a l t o pay t h e " g r o s s pay" of $ 7 5 0 . 0 0

Plaintiff

Lee

Shuster

for

his

work

from

October

1

through

O c t o b e r 1 4 , 1992 i s a v i o l a t i o n o f s a i d Employment Agreement.

COUNT I I

15.

Plaintiff Lee Shuster repeats and realleges Paragraphs 4

through 12.
16.

Defendant ACT has at all relevant times maintained and

had custody of all sales records necessary to determine commissions
and gross pay owed to Plaintiff Lee Shuster.
17.

On October 15, 1992 Defendant ACT knew that no sales had

occurred during the period from October 1 through October 14, 1992
and thus knew that no commissions were owed to Plaintiff Lee
4

Shuster at the time of separation from employment.
18. Despite Plaintiff Shuster's written demand on October 15,
1992, to be paid for his work from October 1 through October 14,
1992 Defendant ACT failed and refused to pay Plaintiff Lee Shuster
any wages at all for over forty-five (45) days, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 (Supp. 1992).
19.
November

Despite Plaintiff Lee Shuster's second written demand on
19, 1992, Defendant ACT

failed

and

refused

to pay

Plaintiff Lee Shuster the wages due under the Employment Agreement,
and paid wages based upon minimum wage law over forty-five (45)
days after Plaintiff's separation (and 12 days after the second
demand), in violation of Utah Code Ann. §34-28-5 (Supp. 1992).
20. Given Defendant's failure to pay the wages owed under the
Agreement, Plaintiff Shuster's wages continue as a civil penalty
for sixty (60) days at the rate under the Agreement ($1500 per
month) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5(2) (Supp. 1992).

COUNT III
21.

Plaintiff Lee Shuster repeats and realleges Paragraphs 4

through 12.
22. Plaintiff Lee Shuster repeats and realleges Paragraphs 15
through 19.
23.

Given Defendant's failure to pay even minimum wage as
5

wages owed Plaintiff

for over forty-five

(45) days following

separation and demand, Plaintiff Shuster's entitlement to minimum
wage continues as a civil penalty from October 15 to December 1,
1992 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5(2) (Supp. 1992).

COUNT IV
24.

Plaintiff repeats and realleges Paragraphs 4 - 1 2 .

25.

Plaintiff repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 5 - 1 9 .

26.

On or about November 19, 1992, at least 15 days before

filing this action, Plaintiff Lee Shuster made written demand for
$750.00 in gross pay, the wages due under the Employment Agreement.
27.

On or about November 19, 1992, at least 15 days before

filing this action, Plaintiff Lee Shuster offered to settle his
claim to any civil penalty under Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 (Supp.
1992) for $750 in gross pay.
28.

Plaintiff

Lee

Shuster

is

entitled

attorneys' fee in addition to the amount due

to

reasonable

for wages and

penalties, to be taxed as costs of suit, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 34-27-1 (Repl.Vol.1988) .

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Lee Shuster prays for judgment against
Defendant Applied Computer Techniques, Inc. as follows:
a.

an award of damages for gross pay due and owing under the
6

Employment Agreement in the amount of $410.00; and
b.

an award of damages as a civil penalty for ACT'S failure

to pay wages owed in a timely fashion, such penalty to equal the
wage rate to which Plaintiff was entitled at the time of separation
until paid or for 60 days, in an amount not less than $1020.00 if
the Court finds Plaintiff entitled to wages at the minimum wage
rate and not less than $3000.00 if the Court finds Plaintiff
entitled to gross pay under the Employment Agreement; and
c.

reasonable attorneys' fees; and

d.

such other relief as is just and equitable.

DATED this 14th day of December, 1992.

LINDA FAYE SMITH

Linda Faye»Sn£th^(Bar No. 4460)
Attorney for Plaintiff
Lee K. Shuster
c/o University of Utah
College of Law
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
Telephone: (801) 581-4 077
Plaintiff's Name:
Plaintiff's Address:

Lee K. Shuster
1337 Yale Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 85105
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EXHIBIT A
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
This Agreement is made this 2_%ay of ftl A&fijf- . 1 9 2 2 f b y and between Applied Computer
Techniques, a Utah corporation (hereinafter called "Employer) and sLee ^
Sjti/fT'&T
(hereinafter
called •Employee"), witnesseth:
WHEREAS, Employer is engaged in the business of marketing computer data processing and
information handling systems to end-users, including beer, wine, soda and bottled water distributors, and
other distribution-oriented businesses;
WHEREAS, Employer desires to engage Employee to market its goods and services primarily to
beer, wine, soda and bottled water distributors, and other distribution-oriented businesses located
throughout the world;
WHEREAS, Employee desires to be employed by Employer subject to the terms and conditions
contained in this Agreement;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual warranties, covenants and conditions herein
contained, Employer and Employee hereby agree as follows:
1. PURPOSE: Employer engages Employee to market its goods and services to beer, wine, soda
and bottled water distributors, and other distribution-oriented businesses located throughout the world.
It is not intended that the entire world shall be the exclusive territory of Employee. Employer
reserves the right to modify the geographic scope of Employee's territory as well as the nature or type of
prospective clients from whom Employee shall solicit business.
2. TERM: The term of employment under this Agreement shall begin on rE0>PuA&/
19j£Zrand continue until terminated as herein provided.

Z&

3. DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS: Employer hereby employs Employee to act as a sales
representative whose duties shall include, but not be necessarily limited to the following:
A. Identify and contact prospective users of products of Employer in designated geographical
areas;
B. Meet in person or by telephone with management representatives of such prospective users
and survey their present and future data processing and information handling needs and recommend
products of Employer where applicable;
C. Produce and provide to prospective customers timely written proposals detailing the costs,
functions, and benefits of the proposed products and services of Employers;
D. Meet in person or by telephone with the decision-making representatives of prospective
customers in an effort to obtain orders for products and services of Employer;
E. When directed by management, assist in the collection of all sums due from persons to whom
the goods and merchandise of Employer are sold and in the adjustment of any complaints or disputes that
may arise in connection with any sales made by him.
4. PERFORMANCE: Employee agrees to devote all of his time and efforts during normal
business hours of Employer to the performance and duties on behalf of Employer in the role of sales
representative. In carrying out his duties, Employee has no authority to Incur obligations or make financial

apresentations or financial commitments on behalf of Employer, except as approved by Employer prior
} such commitments.
5. COMPENSATION: For all of the services to be rendered by Employee in any capacity
lereunder, Employer agrees to pay Employee a commission based upon Employee's sales of the goods
ind services offered by Employer.
A. The commission rate shall be:
1) Twenty (20) percent of the gross profit on each sale to a new customer which Is attributable
to Employee.
"New customer- is defined to be any firm or party who has not previously purchased from
Employer.
"Gross profit" shall mean the difference between the total revenue actually received by Employer
for each sale attributable to Employee, less the actual cost to Employer of the goods sold by Employee,
less any charges to the customer for custom programming and/or training, less the actual cost to Employer
of Employee's travel, meals and lodging attributed to each sale on a sale-by-sale basis, less any charge
backs.
"Charge backs" shall mean products returned to Employer from customer for any reason and in
any time frame, or products which are not fully paid for by buyer after a period of sixty (60) days. Charge
backs to Employee due to failure by the buyer to remit payment in full will become commissionaire to
Employee once full payment has been received by Employer from buyer.
By way of example, if gross sales by Employee and cost of product related to such sales are
$25,000 and $12,500 respectively, and the gross sale includes $1,000 of custom programming and/or
training, and the cost of Employee's travel, meals and lodging associated with the sale is $1,000, and a
customer returned a $1,000 product for which the Employee had previously been paid a commission, the
gross profit would be computed as follows:
$
$

25,000
12,500
1,000
1,000
1.000
9,500

$9,500x.20

Gross sales
Cost of product
Custom programming and/or training
Cost of travel, meals, and lodging
Charge back for returned product
Gross profit
« $1,900

Any sale which is deferred because of the unavailability of required custom programming to be
performed by Employer will be considered to be a sale to a "New Customer" for the purpose of determining
the commission rate.
2) Sales of products or services to an existing customer will be commissionable to Employee
under the following conditions and according to the following commission schedule:
(a) The sale is directly attributable to Employee's efforts;
(b) Employee was responsible for the initial sale made to the customer;

2

(c) The sale to the existing customer is made within one year.of customers' initial purchase. The
following schedule will be made to determine the commission percentage paid to Employee:
Days Following Initial Purchase
1 through 90 days
91 through 270 days
271 through 365 days

Commission rate
Twenty (20) percent
Fifteen (15) percent
Ten (10) percent

"Existing customer* Is defined as any firm or party who has previously purchased from Employer.
3) Sales to a multiple system customer will be commissionable to Employee at eleven (11) percent
of the gross profit on each sale, provided that:
(a) The sale is directly attributable to Employee's efforts;
(b) Employee was responsible for the initial sale made to the customer.
"Multiple system customer" is defined to be any firm or party who purchases more than one
software license for the same software module(s).
B. The commission provided for herein shall be payable to Employee on the next occurring
regular payday of Employer immediately after becoming a commissionable sale.
-Next occurring regular payday* shall mean the earliest of either the sixteenth day of the current
month or the first day of the following month.
"Commissionable sale" shall mean a sale for which Employee has received the Employer's
Purchase Agreement from the prospect, properly signed and executed by a duly authorized representative
of the prospect firm or institution, and a deposit of not less than seventy-five (75) percent of the total
purchase price.
C. Employer shall furnish Employee upon request the data and computations used in arriving at
the commission amount.
D. In the event Employee ceases to be employed by Employer for any reason, Employee shall be
entitled to commissions as described herein for commissionable sales received by Employer which are
attributable to Employee's efforts for a period of thirty (30) days following Employee's termination, less any
charge backs arising from previous sales by Employee which may occur during the above 30-day period
following termination, less any outstanding draws which may exist
6. DRAW: Employee will be paid a draw against future commissions according to the following
schedule:
Days Following Employment
1 through 60 days
61 through 90 days
91 days on

Draw
$2,800 per month
$2,200 per month
$1,500 per month
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If commissions earned do not equal the draw per month as outlined above, Employer shall add that
amount necessary to cause Employee's gross pay to equal the monthly amount shown, such amount to
be considered a draw against future commissions. In any month In which commissions earned exceed
3

,500 and a draw balance exists, the excess over $2,500 shall be used to recover any outstanding draws
aviously paid to Employee.
7. PRODUCT PRICING AND POLICIES. All prices, discount policies, sales and service policies
II be established by Employer and adhered to by Employee. Employer shall promptly notify Employee
all price and policy changes and new product availability.
8. SALES ACCEPTANCE* Employer reserves the right of final decision on any sales, including
ceptance of any orders. Employee will obtain written approval In advance on all proposals offered in
itten form to prospective customers.
9. INSURANCE: Employee shall be entitled to coverage under Employer's existing health and
;cident plan if he qualifies thereunder and is in accordance with the terms of such written insurance
>licy and program. Coverage shall be provided at no cost beginning 90 days after employment date,
lould Employee elect to cover dependents, Employer shall deduct the premium from Employee's check
i a monthly basis and at the then-current rates. Employer shall advise Employee of any changes In the
surance policies and company policies with respect thereto prior to the effective date of any such change.
10. VACATION: Employee shall be entitled to receive vacation pay according to the following
;hedule:
irst year
econd through eighth year
inth year and on

1/52 of total earned commission during the first year of employment
2/52 of total earned commission during each year of employment
3/52 of total earned commission during each year of employment

"Earned commission" shall mean the commission amount paid to Employee for sales directly
ttributable to Employee.
Pay will be paid as a bonus each year on the anniversary date of Employee's employment as
tipulated in paragraph 2, Terms.
11. EXPENSES: Employer shall reimburse Employee for all expenses incurred by Employee in
jrtherance of his duties and obligations under this Agreement contingent upon prior approval of such
ixpenses by Employer and receipt of proper documentary evidence in support of such expenses. In that
egard, Employee agrees to report his expenses on a weekly basis in a daily diary format Expenses shall
>e broken down by client and shall be on forms acceptable to Employer.
Only the following items shall be reimbursable:
A. Actual travel and lodging expense directly related to sales and marketing efforts.
B. Meals expense while out-of-town overnight, to a maximum of $25 per day.
C. In the event Employee must use his own automobile, a mileage allowance of 25.5 cents per
mile will be paid, provided Employee submits a mileage log identifying actual odometer readings and other
documentary evidence as may be required by Employer.
In addition, Employer shall furnish Employee with a telephone credit card and/or other means of
covering the costs associated with making long-distance, business-related telephone calls.

4

12. ITEMS FURNISHED BY EMPLOYER:
A. Employer shall provide Employee with computer hardware and software for demonstration
purposes and for use in preparing presentation material for clients and prospective clients as deemed
necessary by Employer. Hardware and software furnished Employee shall remain the property of
Employer and shall be returned to Employer promptly upon termination of this Agreement Employee shafl
be liable to Employer for the loss, theft or damage to the software and/or hardware while In employee4!
personal possession. When necessary to release software and/or hardware to any third party. Employee
shall exercise utmost judgment and Insure the equipment wherever possfble.
B. Employer shall furnish Employee with client and prospective client information which shall
include but not be limited to mail and telephone lists, as well as proprietary, demographic Information
pertaining to clients and prospective clients. Upon termination of this Agreement, Employee shall promptly
return all of such data and information to Employer.
13. TERMINATION: Either party may terminate this Agreement at any time, without cause and
without advance notice.
14. DEATH: In the event Employee's death occurs during the term of this Agreement, the
Agreement shall terminate immediately and Employee's legal representative shall be entitled to receive any
compensation due to Employee under the provisions outlined above.
15. CONFIDENTIALITY: Since Employee will have access to the information which a customer
of Employer may deem to be confidential, Employee agrees that he will keep all such information, data,
and materials of such customers fully confidential and shall not disclose such information or data to
anyone who is not an employee or employer of the customer except on specific order of a court of a
competent jurisdiction. Employee further agrees that all written materials, software programs, tapes, card
decks, or other physical embodiment of any software program relating to the business of Employer and
its customer, whether prepared by Employee or received by Employee during his employment or thereafter,
and any copies thereof all belong solely to Employer.
Employee further agrees that all company information including contracts, customer lists, prospect
lists, proprietary product information, company procedures and policies, etc. shall be deemed to be
confidential and all such material shall belong solely to Employer despite the fact that they may have been
prepared in part or wholly by Employee or Employee may have received copies thereof during the course
of his employment. At any time during or after the employment period, Employee will upon the request
of Employer deliver all of such items to Employer and shall retain no copies. All of such materials written
or produced by Employee or under his supervision at any time during his employment shall be and are
owned by Employer if they relate in any manner to the business of Employer either now or In the future.
Employee will not during or after the term of his employment furnish to any individual, firm or corporation
any list of customers or other information relating to Employer's business. He will at all times protect all
proprietary information of Employer and will not disclose or use any of the computer programs and
materials related to it which are used by Employer in its business which are proprietary to Employer,
16. COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE: Employee agrees that during his employment and for a
period of two years immediately following the termination of his employment for any reason he will not
either alone or with or on behalf of any other person, firm, partnership, or corporation undertake to
compete with Employer or seek to divert business or destroy or affect the business relationship that exists
between Employer and its customers.
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17. NO INTERFERENCE OF EMPLOYMENT: Following Employee's termination of employment,
nployee will not solicit for hire any current employee of Employer.
18. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF EMPLOYEE: Employee represents aiid
irrants as follows:
A. That by entering into this Agreement and performing the duties and obligations outlined herein,
) is not in violation of any contract of employment previously entered into with another employer;
B. That during the term of this Agreement, Employee will not misrepresent any of the products
services offered by Employer;
C. That during the term of this Agreement, Employee will not violate the copyright or trade secret
ovisions of any software license agreement, non-disclosure agreement, or confidentiality agreement,
mployer has executed or may be required to execute during the course of Employee's employment.
In the event a legal action is threatened or maintained against Employer arising out of or related
Employee's warranties and representations, Employee agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Employer
r all legal costs and expenses associated with the defense of such actions, as well as any monetary
dgments taken against Employer as a result of such actions.
19, EFFECT OF WAIVER: The waiver of any party of a breach of any provision of this
greement shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach thereof.
20. NOTICE: Any and all notices required herein shall be sufficient if furnished in writing, sent
/ registered mail, to the respective parties at their address described below following their signatures to
lis Agreement Such other addresses as needed may hereinafter by supplied by either party.
21 ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This Agreement contains the entire agreement of the parties and
upersedes all prior written and oral communications.
22. AMENDMENT: Any amendment, modification or change shall be in writing and signed by
oth parties and shall be amended hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the day and year
rst above-written.
EMPLOYEE^

:mployee signature

/££g

K.

$!>HVS-TQ<,

Employee name printed

.EMPLOYER

VaugrurJ ChrisWnsen
Applied Computer Techniques
772 East 3300 South, #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

rPrttr/stKc&'ry, UT
Employee address
6

EXHIBIT B

1337 East Yale Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84105-1612

October 15,1992
Dear Vaughn:
Attached you will find the letter I have been preparing to memorialize and to respond to our meetings of
October 7 and 8, 1002. That lattar give* you the response you asked for regarding your offer of
employment on a straight commission basis and it responds to your request for ideas about ACTs sales
and marketing strategy.
I am writing this additional letter to clarify the situation in light of the memo you handed me yesterday.
Gene Castle (the other salesman) and I both understood you and Linda to announce a termination of our
Employment Agreements effective November 15, 1992. I believe that is what Gene's letter sets forth (to
which your memo is a response). I also understood that to be the situation in light of the Draw and
Commission Report which included Linda's handwritten calculations of future compensation to be paid
to me into November,(Linda's notes indicated a cap on draw of $13,464.16, now your memo gives a cap
which has inexplicitly changed to $13,000.00.)
Now your written memo states that you are terminating my Agreement immediately. Accordingly, I will
be removing my property today (October 15).
Your October 14 memo states that the termination of the Agreement "will become effective
Wednesday October 7,1992" since it was your "intention to terminate the Employment Agreement...
and execute a new one... as of that same date." It is not profitable to dispute what your intention may
have been or what we remember you saying last week.
The Agreement entitles you to 'terminate this Agreement at any time, without cause and without
advance notice" (Para. 13). However, the Agreement also requires that "Any amendment modification,
M
or change shall be in writing and signed by both parties
(Para. 22) and "Any and all notices
required herein shall be sufficient if furnished in writing
"(Para. 20). Accordingly the Agreement
was not terminated on October 7, and no new agreement went into effect on October 7. Rather, you
have terminated my employment as of today. Please let me know when I may come in to pick up my
final pay check for my work (including the preliminary market analysts you requested) through October
14,1992.
I think it should be abundantly clear to you that I have absolutely no interest or desire to accept the totally
unreasonable contractual terms that you have presented. The precipitous action you have taken
yesterday only reconfirms my conclusion that your firm has very little ability to engage in fiscal analysis
or sound business planning. Best of luck to you I

Lee K. Shuster
Account Representative

EXHIBIT C

S oppled oorr^uter technique/
772 East 3300 South
Suite 200
Salt lake City, Utah 84106
(801)486-0073

October 19, 1992

Lee Shuster
1337 East Yale Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105-1612
Dear Lee:
In your resignation letter of October 15, 1992, you
asked me to let you know when you could come in to pick
up your final pay check "for my work.••through October
14, 1992." In response I would like to remind you that
your compensation is not based upon 'your work' during
the pay period, but instead, it is based upon commissions
earned on ACT goods and services you sell.
Paragraph 5 of the Employment Agreement that you and
I signed plainly states that "Employer agrees to pay
Employee a commission based upon Employee's sales of the
goods and services offered by Employer.11 As you didn't
have any sales during the pay period, no commissions were
earned.
Further, per the Agreement in paragraph 5D, you are
"entitled to commissions as described herein for
commissionable sales received by Employer which are
attributable to Employee's efforts for a period of thirty
(30) days following Employee's termination, less any
charge backs arising from previous sales by Employee
which may occur during the above 30-day period following
termination, less any outstanding draws which may exist."
Accordingly, a final settlement between us will be
made on November 14, 1992, at which time, you will be
paid for all commissions earned between October 15 and
November 14, 1992, less any charge backs which may arise,
less the outstanding draws issued you to date of
$11,632.86.

EXHIBIT D

1337 East Yale Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84106-1612

November 19,1992
Vaughn Christensen
Applied Computer Techniques, Inc.
772 East 3300 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Re: Wages Due
Dear Vaughn:
I had hoped to hear from you at mid-month to receive the commissions or gross pay due me for the
period I worked for ACT from October 1 through October 14, 1992. I believe the terms of our Agreement
(dated March 2, 1992) entitle me to be paid a minimum of $750.00 for that period, whether or not you
ultimately obtained any commissionable sales from my prospective customers. The legal advice that I
have received confirms this interpretation of the Agreement, and I had hoped that you too might have
checked and discovered this to be the case.
If you have had a chance to look into this issue, I would appreciate your forwarding that payment
($750.00) to me within the week. If I receive it, I will consider myself to be paid in fullforall claims that
could exist between us; and I will wish you and Linda well in your business.
I understand that your failure to pay me for that two-week period of work may violate both state and
federal minimum wage laws. (The U. S. Department of Labor and the Utah Industrial Commission are
charged with investigating such violations, and should be able to confirm this interpretation).
My lawyer has advised me that Utah law required you to pay me within 24 hours of the end of my
employment Given your failure to do so, despite my written request of October 15,1992, Utah law
provides that the contractual wages continue from the date of my request until the wages are paid, for up
to 60 days. (I enclose a copy of the relevant statute, U.C.A. 34-28-5).
I do intend to insist upon your payment to me of the gross wages due me. If I am forced to file suit to do
so, I will request not only the $750 wages for October 1 -14, but also the full amount due under the law
(an additional $3000 for 60 days past October 14). I will also seek attorneys1 fees under U.C.A. 34-27-1.
I hope you will be able to confirm with your legal counsel my right to receive gross pay of $750.00 under
the Agreement, so that we may have an amicable conclusion of our business relationship.
Sincerely,

K^ /

Lee K. Shuster

enc.

fe.

EXHIBIT E

oppled computer technique/
772 East 3300 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801) 486-0073

December 1.1992

Lee K. Shuster
1337 East Yale Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84105-1612
Dear Lee:
According to paragraph 5D of your Employment Agreement dated March 2,1992,
Applied Computer Techniques is obligated to pay commissions for sales received which
are attributable to your efforts for a period of thirty days following your termination. This
thirty-day period ended November 14, 1992. During this period, no additional sales were
received. Hence, no additional commissions are due you. A concluding Draw and
Commission Report is enclosed.
In regard to the disputed payment of $750 for the period October 1 through 14,1
have learned from the Industrial Commission that because your semimonthly checks were
draws against future commissions when no commissions were earned, i am not obligated
to advance you additional draws. However, according to the Commission, federal and
state statutes require that i compensate you for your time at minimum wage for the period
of October 1-14,1992. Accordingly, I have enclosed a check for 80 hours of pay at $4.25
per hour, less applicable taxes.
As I was preparing this check, a question arose concerning the $90.15 deduction
taken from your checks for dependent insurance coverage. In researching the matter, I
found that $631.05 had been deducted to date, but dependent premiums from 7/16/92
through 10/15/92 were only $540.90. Hence, a reimbursement of $90.15 is included on
the check.
I hope that you will consider this an amicable conclusion of our business
relationship. Linda and I both wish you well in your future business pursuits.

Sincerely,

~#att

Vaugty* J Cbfnstensen
President
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Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369)
Attorney for Defendant
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTX, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
LEE K. SHUSTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
APPLIED COMPUTER
TECHNIQUES, INC.,

)

ANSWER

)

Civil No. 920016945 CV

])

Judge Dennis M. Fuchs

Defendant,
Answering the Complaint of Plaintiff, Defendant admits, denies
and avers as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Avers that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
1.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraphs one, two,

three, four, five and six.
2.

Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph

seven.
3.

Admits each and every allegation contained in paragraphs

nine, ten, eleven and twelve.
4.

Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraphs

thirteen, fourteen and Plaintiff incorporates by reference hereat
its answers to paragraphs four through twelve incorporated by
reference at paragraph fifteen.
5.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph sixteen,

seventeen and eighteen,
6.

Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph

nineteen and twenty.
7.

Defendant

repeats,

realleges

and

incorporates

by

reference hereat its answers to paragraphs four through twelve
incorporated by reference at paragraphs twenty one and paragraph
twenty two.
8.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraph twenty

three.
9.

Defendant

repeats,

realleges

and

incorporates

by

reference hereat its answers to paragraphs four through twelve set
forth at paragraph twenty four and paragraphs fifteen through
nineteen set forth at paragraph twenty five.
10.

Admits that on or about December 12, 1992, Plaintiff made

written demand for $7,750 in gross pay but denies that said wages
were due Plaintiff under the employment agreement.
11.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph twenty

seven.
12.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraph twenty
2

eight•
13.

Denies each and every allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint

not specifically admitted herein.
THIRD DEFENSE
Avers that all suras owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff
under the Agreement between the parties and under Title 34 of the
Utah Code Annotated have been paid by the Defendant in full.
WHEREFORE,

having

fully

answered

Plaintiff's

Complaint,

Defendant demands that the same be dismissed and that he be awarded
its costs incurred herein and such other and further relief as the
Court deems just in the premises.
DATED this /

day of February, 1^93.

7
/

lomas R.^Hlonquist
MAIpTNG CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to Linda Faye Smith, Esq., C/0
University of Utah, College of Law, Salt Lake City, UT

t

day of February, 1993.

y

/^

Thomas/k. ^lonquist
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LINDA FAYE SMITH, #44 60
Attorney for Plaintiff
C/O University of Utah
College of Law
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
Telephone: 581-4077
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

AMDENDED I^EMORANDUM OF

LEE K. SHUSTER,

POINTS #ND AUTHORITIES

Plaintiff,

IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

vs.
*
*

fOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 920016945

APPLIED COMPUTER
TECHNIQUES, INC.

Judge Dennis M. Fuchs
Defendant.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The material facts are undisputed:
1.

On or about February 26, 1992 plaintiff Mr. Shuster and Applied

Computer Techniques,

Inc.

(hereinafter

"ACT")

entered

into

to an

Employment Agreement attached as Exhibit A. (Complaint 1 4, admitted in

Answer f l, Exhibit

A to Complaint, copy also attached

hereto as

Exhibit

A.)
2.

From February 26, 1992 to October 14, 1992 Mr. Shuster worked

for ACT, "devoting all his time and energy during normal business hours"
to ACT'S business.

(Complaint 1 5, admitted in Answer 1 1,

6S

Agreement 1 4 .)
3.

From February 26, 1992 to September 30, 1992, ACT paid Mr.

Shuster the "gross pay" provided for under Paragraph 6 of the Employment
Agreement, since the commissions earned never exceeded such "gross pay."
(Complaint 1 6, admitted in Answer 1 1) .
4. The employment relationship ended on October 15, 1992, At that
time Mr. Shuster made written demand to ACT for payment of wages for his
work from October 1, 1992 through October 14, 1992.

(Complaint 1 9,

admitted in Answer 1 3, Exhibit B) .
5. On October 19, 1992 ACT wrote Mr. Shuster and refused to pay any
wages whatsoever for this two-week period, on the grounds that "no
commissions were earned" during that period. (Complaint 1 10, admitted
in Answer 1 3, Exhibit C) .
6.

On November 19, 1992, Mr. Shuster again wrote and demanded the

"gross pay" of $750 provided for in the Employment Agreement. Mr. Shuster
further informed ACT that its failure to pay him any amount whatsoever
not only violated the Agreement but violated state and federal minimum
wage law. (Complaint 1 11, admitted in Answer 1 3. Exhibit D)
7.

On or about December 1, 1992 ACT paid Mr. Shuster gross pay of

$340, representing minimum wage for 80 hours of work; but again failed
and refused to pay the gross pay of $750 as demanded pursuant to the
Employment Agreement.

(Complaint 1 12, admitted in Answer 1 3, Exhibit

E.)
8. ACT failed and refused to pay Mr. Shuster any wages whatsoever
for Mr. Shuster's last two week of work; and this failure continued for
2

approximately forty-five (45) days after the end of his employment and
after his written demand for payment of wages, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 34-28-5 (Supp. 1992).
9.

(Complaint 1 18, admitted in Answer 1 5).

Mr. Shuster made written demand for "gross pay" of $750 under

the Agreement on or about November 19, 1992 which was more than 15 days
before bringing this action on December 14, 1992. (Complaint i 26 & 27,
admitted in Answer 1 10 & 11.)
10.

Mr. Shuster commenced this action on December 14, 1992 which

is within 60 days of his separation from ACT'S employment.

(Complaint

as filed, Complaint 1 9 admitted in Answer 1 3).

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF LAW
Plaintiff Lee Shuster is entitled to judgment as a matter of law for
the wages owed him under the party's employment contract, for statutory
civil penalties due to his former employer's failure to pay wages in a
timely fashion, and for reasonable attorneys' fees to be taxed as
statutory costs of this suit.

I. THE PARTIES' EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT ENTITLES PLAINTIFF LEE SHUSTER TO
THE CONTRACTUAL "GROSS PAY" OF $750 FOR HIS FINAL TWO WEEKS OF WORK.
The employee Mr. Shuster was and is entitled, under the Employment
Agreement, to wages of $750 for his final two weeks of work.
The interpretation of the Employment Agreement is a matter of law.
Zions

First

Nat'l

Bank v.

National

Am. Title

Ins.

Co. 749 P.2d 581, 582

(Utah, 1988) . This contract is not ambiguous. Faulkner
3

v. Farnsworth

665

P. 2d 1292, 1293 (Utah, 1983) (whether the contract is ambiguous and
requires parol evidence to understand is itself a question of law). This
Court should interpret the terms of this contract "according to their
plain and ordinary meaning." Equitable

Life

& Casualty

Ins.

Co. v.

Ross

849 P. 2d 1187, 1192 (Utah. App., 1993).
Paragraph 5 of the Agreement sets forth a compensation structure
involving "commissions" to be based upon the employee's sales of goods.
Paragraph 6 sets forth provisions for paying a "draw against future
commissions" (also called "gross pay"). Following 91 days of employment,
that amount of gross pay is $1500 per month. (1 6) ,

There is no

contingency or ambiguity regarding the Employer's obligation to pay the
employee, at a minimum, this gross pay each pay period.

And until the

final pay period, ACT did always pay this "gross pay." (Statement of
Material Facts 1 3, above.)
In two circumstances the Agreement does cap the amount of commissions
the employee can earn based upon the outstanding "draw." Paragraph 6
provides that in any month in which commissions earned exceed $2500 and
a "draw balance" exists, "the excess [commissions] over $2500 shall be
used to recover any outstanding draws previously paid to the Employee."
Paragraph 5D addresses what occurs when the employment relationship ends:
the

employee

is

entitled

to

commissions

for

30

days

"following

termination. . . less any outstanding draws." The only provision dealing
with the termination of employment gives the employer greater rights to
recapture "draws" from "commissions."
suggest

that the employee

The contract does not begin to

is entitled to anything
4

less than the

contractual "gross pay" for his last weeks on the job.
The employer's initial interpretation1 of the contract--that Mr.
Shuster was entitled to no wages whatsoever for his final two weeks of
full-time labor for ACT--was, of course, illegal. The federal Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Utah Minimum Wage Act and state regulation require
employers to pay their employees at least minimum wage for their work.
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 206; Utah Code Ann. § 34-40-101 et. seq. ; and Utah Reg.
572-1-3. See also Pierce

v. Anagnostakis

394 P.2d 74, 75-76 (Utah, 1964)

(waitress's agreement to work for only tips did not bar suit under Utah
statute for minimum wage).
The

employer's

unconscionable.

interpretation(s)2 of

this

contract

are also

ACT'S interpretation(s) would make the wages owed an

employee entirely dependent upon the date when employment ended. If the
employee resigned the day after "payday," he might be fully compensated.
If, as in this case, the employment terminated the day the pay period
ended, the employer would have obtained two weeks of free (or "halfpriced") labor.

Surely that cannot be the meaning of any employment

contract which can be terminated with no notice. (Agreement 1 13)
This contract should not be considered ambiguous simply because the
defendant "ascribes a different meaning to it to suit his or her own
interests." Equitable

1

Life

& Casualty

Ins.

Co. v. Ross 849 P. 2d 1187,

See Exhibit C, Letter from ACT.

2

ACT's ultimate payment of minimum wage may indicate that ACT's
current position is that the contract requires the payment of
minimum wage.
5

1192 (Utah. App., 1993) citing Larson

v. Overland

2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991) cert, denied,

Thrift

and Loan 818 P.

832 P.2d 476 (Utah, 1992).

The only plain, sensible and legal interpretation of the contract that
ACT drafted and Mr. Shuster signed is that Mr. Shuster is entitled to the
"gross pay" amount (here $750) for his last two weeks in ACT's employ.

II. ACT'S FAILURE TO PAY ANY WAGES FOR OVER 45 DAYS AFTER MR. SHUSTER'S
EMPLOYMENT HAD CEASED VIOLATED STATE STATUTE AND ACT MUST PAY THE
STATUTORY CIVIL PENALTY.
The defendant ACT has admitted that it failed to pay any wages at
all to Mr. Shuster for 45 days, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5.3
It is similarly undisputed that Mr. Shuster gave written demand for his
wages on the day his employment ended, and that he filed this action
within 60 days of that date.4
The Utah Payment of Wages Act (UPWA) requires that an employer
promptly pay an employee final wages5 after the employment relationship
ends. Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5.6

"If the employer fails to do so upon

3

See Statement of Material Facts 1 8 above, relying upon
Complaint 1 18 admitted in Answer 1 5.
4

See Statement of Material Facts 1 8 and 10 above.

3

Although the Employment Agreement speaks of "commissions",
as well as "gross pay," the statute defines the term "wages" to
include "commissions." Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-2.
6

The time periods vary slightly depending upon whether the
employer "separates" an employee from the payroll (24 hours) or the
employee "resigns" (72 hours). In this case, these differences are
irrelevant, since ACT failed to pay any wages for 45 days, violating
the statute irrespective of which subsection applies. The statutory
6

the employee's written demand for payment, the employee's wages continue
to accrue from the date of written demand until payment is made, but no
longer than sixty days." Smith

v. Batchelor

832 P. 2d 467, 469 (Utah,

1992)(dicta).
The statute provides that the "wages of the employee shall continue•
• at the same rate which the employee received at the time of
separation." Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5(2) (emphasis added) . The statutory
word "shall" indicates that this is a mandatory penalty. Indeed, the trial
court in Smith

v. Batchelor

saw this penalty as mandatory.7

Irrespective of whether Mr. Shuster was owed the contractual wage
(See Point I) or minimum wage, ACT violated the UWPA by failing to pay
any wages to Mr. Shuster within the statutory time period. The only issue
for this Court to determine is which wage rate--and thus which penaltyapplies. If this Court finds that Mr. Shuster was owed $1500 per month
under the Agreement, then the penalty must be ordered for the statutory
period of 60 days, or for $3000. If this Court determines that Mr. Shuster
was owed only minimum wage for his final two weeks of work for ACT, then
exception for certain "sales agent[s] employed on a commission
basis" does not apply here because Mr. Shuster did not have "custody
of accounts" and the net amount due him was not determined "only
after an audit or verification of sales, accounts, funds or stocks."
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 (1)(b). See Complaint 1 16 & 17 admitted
in Answer 1 5.
7

In Smith v. Batchelor,
the trial court denied recovery under
the federal Fair Labor Standard's Act given the recovery awarded
under the UWPA. The Supreme Court reversed: "The trial court found.
. . that equity prohibits both state and federal recovery for the
same violation. This is incorrect. Equity follows the law. It
cannot abridge an explicit statutory requirement." Smith
v.
Batchelor
at 471.
7

this Court must award his $1021 as the mandatory penalty at that minimum
wage for the 45 days Mr. Shuster received no payment at all.

III.

IF THIS COURT FINDS MR. SHUSTER ENTITLED TO WAGES UNDER THE

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT, THIS COURT MUST ALSO ORDER REASONABLE ATTORNEYS'
FEES.
The Employment Agreement provided for "gross pay11 of $750 per pay
period, and Mr. Shuster has been paid only $340 for the final two-week
period.

(See Point I, supra.)

If this Court holds that Mr. Shuster is

entitled to wages under the Agreement, this Court should also award
reasonable attorney's fees.
Utah statute provides for attorneys fees in suits for wages. Utah
Code Ann. § 34-27-1. Three criteria must be met:

there must have been

a written demand for wages "at least 15 days before suit." There has been
here. (See Statement of Fact 1 9) . The demand must "not exceed the amount
so due.n Mr. Shuster's claim has consistently been that wages of $750 were
owed. If this Court finds "that the amount for which he has brought suit
is justly due" then:
"it shall be the duty of the court. . . to allow to the plaintiff
a reasonable attorneys' fee in addition to the amount found due for
wages, to be taxed as costs of suit." Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1.
Here again, this statute uses mandatory, not discretionary language.
The possibility of some confusion between "commissions" and "gross pay"
should not preclude recovery under this section.
Robinson's

Medical

Mart,

Inc.

See Bennett

v.

417 P.2d 761, 765 (Utah, 1966) (salesman

awarded attorneys' fees for commissions he had demanded.) Also see
8

Pierce

v. Anagnostakis

394 P.2d 74, 75-76 (Utah, 1964) (attorney's fees not

awarded because waitress had demanded more than court awarded, but minimum
wage ordered despite evidence waitress agreed to "tips only" to defraud
IRS) The public policy behind enforcement of wage laws supports the award
of attorneys' fees even if they are large in comparison with the wages
recovered:
As a general rule, the amounts recoverable under the FLSA and the
UPWA are so small that attorney fees will exceed any potential
recovery. Hence, unless an award of attorney fees is available,
workers would be unable to enforce their rights under these
statutes. Smith v. Batchelor
832 P.2d at 474 (J. Stewart, concurring
and dissenting).
Calculation of attorneys' fees is in the sound discretion of the
trial court. Jenkins

v. Bailey

676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah, 1984). An award

of attorneys' fees must be supported by evidence in the record. See
Cabrera

v. Cottrell

694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah, 1985).

Here Mr. Shuster

submits and relies upon the Affidavit of Counsel Linda Faye Smith.
The factors which should be considered include: "the efficiency of
the attorneys in presenting the case"s (here, without any unnecessary
discovery, this Court may dispose of this case entirely on the pleadings) ;
"the reasonableness of the number of hours"9 (the Affidavit sets forth
the time and tasks) ; "the expertise and experience"10 (the Affidavit sets
forth counsel's background); the "necessity of bringing a law suit to
8

See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken
1988) quoting Cabrera at 622.
9
10

Id.
Id.
9

764 P.2d 985, 989 (Utah App.,

vindicate the rights under the contract"11 (this seems clear from the case
itself).
The Utah Court of Appeals in the leading Dixie

State

Bank v.

Bracken

case has stated that "as a practical matter" in awarding reasonable
attorneys' fees this Court should answer the following four questions:
"1.

What legal work was actually performed?"12

Here there has been legal research on the issues of contract law, and
federal and state wage law; drafting of pleadings; and drafting the Motion
and Memorandum for Summary Judgment.
"2.

How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to

adequately prosecute the matter?"
All of the work was reasonably necessary.

No unnecessary discovery or

investigation had taken place.
"3.

Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates

customarily charged in the locality for similar services?"
Counsel bills at a modest rate of $80.00 in the unusual event that she
is engaged in private practice for a fee.

Counsel believes it is

reasonable in this case to award attorneys' fees for all hours spent at
rate of $60. This is a rate consistent with that of a first-year
associate, and is appropriate given the difficulty of the case and that
counsel needed to become familiar with certain local rules and procedures.

11

See Dixie
(Utah# 1984).
12

Bank at 989 quoting Trayner

Id. at 990.
found therein.

v. Cushing 688 P.2d 856

The following numbered quotes 2 - 4 are also
10

"4.

Are there circumstances which require the consideration of

additional factors? . . . ."
The additional factors which merit some consideration are 1) the fact that
the ad damnum in this case is low as compared with the attorneys' fees
sought and 2) the policy reason that supports the award of attorneys' fees
under this statute in order to ensure employers pay the wages owed to
their employees. The Court of Appeals has stated:
Although the amount in controversy can be a factor in determining
a reasonable fee, care should be used in putting much reliance on
this factor. It is a simple fact in a lawyer's life that it takes
about the same amount of time to collect a note in the amount of
$1000 as it takes to collect a note for $100,000." Dixie State Bank
at 990.
In Dixie

State

Bank the Court of Appeals determined attorneys' fees of

$4847.50 to be reasonable based upon the attorney's billing rate of $75
per hour and the fact that the attorney had done no unnecessary work. This
recovery was permitted even though the principal amount on the note to
be collected was only $7695.
Here counsel has similarly not spent unnecessary time pursuing
nonmeritorious claims and has not engaged in unnecessary discovery. The
hours spent have been the minimum amount of time counsel believed
necessary to competently present the legal arguments to this Court to
resolve the matter entirely by Summary Judgment.

As Justice Stewart

recognized, "attorney fees will exceed any potential recovery" in many
wage claim cases. Smith

v. Batchelor

at 474 (J. Stewart concurring and

dissenting) Accordingly, this Court should award attorneys fees for all
time reasonably spent (28.5 hours) at a reasonable rate ($60 per hour)
11

even though that amount ($1710) exceeds the wages recovered.

This is

proper under the wage statutes to enforce the important policy goals of
ensuring that employers pay the workers who depend upon them.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiff Mr. Lee Shuster
requests this Court enter Judgment for him in accordance with the
Complaint for unpaid wages of $410, civil penalties under the Utah Wage
Payment Act of $3000 (or of $1020 if only minimum wage was owed) ,
attorneys' fees of $1710 and costs of $51.07.
DATED this 25th day of October, 1993.

LINDA FAYE SMITH

Linda Faye Smi^h (Bar No. 44 60)
Attorney for Plaintiff
Lee K. Shuster
c/o University of Utah
College of Law
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
(801)581-4077
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Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369)
Attorney for Defendant
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
)

LEE K. SHUSTER,
Plaintiff,

])

v.

)

APPLIED COMPUTER
TECHNIQUES, INC.,

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOHON FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT and
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS ANja^AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT ^HEREOF

]
Civil Jfo. 920016945CV

Defendant.

Judtje Dennis M. Fuchs

Responding to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and his
amended memorandum of points and authorities in support thereof,
Defendant submits the following:
FACT$
The facts material to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
are as follows:
1.

Defendant is in the business of selling computer hardware

and accounting software to beer, wine, soda and bottled water
distributors throughout the United States.
2.

80% of Defendant's revenues come from new sales and 20%

from revenues received from existing customers.
3.

Defendant is only able to stay in business by seeking out

and selling its products to new customers.

4.

On March

2, 1992, Defendant

hired

Plaintiff

as a

commissioned salesman to call on potential new customers and
attempt to sell Defendant's products to them.
5.

At the time the Plaintiff was hired, Defendant's sales

staff comprised two outside salesmen.
6.

By agreement, Plaintiff received commissions

in the

amount of 20% of the gross profit on each sale made by Plaintiff to
a new customer.
7.

Also by agreement, Plaintiff received a draw or prepaid

commissions based upon the length of time of his employment.
8.

At the time Plaintiff terminated his employment, he was

receiving prepaid commissions at the rate of $1,500 per month.
9.

During the period of Plaintiff's employment with the

Defendant, 8 1/2 months, he earned commissions of $1,831.30 but
received advanced commissions of $11,632.86.
10.

From October 1, 1992 to October 14, 1992, Plaintiff made

no sales and, therefore, earned no commission.
11.

During

the

thirty

(30)

days

following

Plaintiff's

termination of employment, none of his prospects purchased products
from the Defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

PLAINTIFF WAS EMPLOYED AS A COMMISSIONED SALESMAN.

Defendant is in the business of selling computer hardware and
2

accounting software and the life blood of its business is seeking
out new customers and selling them Defendant's products.

This is

so because 80% of the Defendant's revenues come from new sales and
20% come from existing customers.
The Defendant hired two outside salesmen, the Plaintiff being
one of them, to solicit new sales, i.e., make telephone contacts
travel

to

the

business

locations

of

potential

customers,

demonstrate Defendant's products and attempt to convince said
potential customers that it would be to their advantage to buy
computer hardware and software from the Defendant.

Because large

revenues are made by the Defendant at the time of the sale of
products to a new customer, all outside salesmen receive, as
commission, 20% of the gross profit of each sale they close.
All sales persons employed by the Defendant since it began
doing business in 1978 have been employed on a commissions basis.
In the instant case, Plaintiff signed an agreement that clearly
spelled out that he was to be paid a commission based upon his
sales of Defendant^ goods and services.
The basis of Plaintiff's compensation is set forth in the
agreement* between the parties at:
1.

The opening paragraph of paragraph 5.

2.

Paragraph 5A which states "the commission rate shall be11.

* The agreement is attached hereto and the areas referred to
have been highlighted in yellow.
3

3.

The "charge backs" paragraph at page 2 talks about when

a sale is "commissionable".
4.

The example paragraph on page 3 refers to a "commission"

and explains how the amount of commission is calculated.
5.

Paragraph 5A 2) defines which goods and services are

"commissionable".
6.

Paragraph 5A 2)(c) defines what the commission percentage

will be.
7.

Paragraph 5A 3) defines the commission to be received

when a sale is made to a customer who buys multiple systems.
8.

Paragraph 5B defines when commissions are payable.

9.

Paragraph 5C requires the Defendant to provide Plaintiff

with the computation showing how the amount Plaintiff's commission
was determined.
10.

Paragraph 5D provides that the employee is entitled to a

commission for any sales that occur within thirty (30) days after
termination, if the Plaintiff was working with the purchasing
customer.
11.

Paragraph

6 defines the schedule

for prepayment of

commissions.
POINT II:

A COMMISSSIONED SALESMAN CANNOT RECEIVE PREPAID
COMMISSIONS UPON TERMINATION.

Because Plaintiff was a salesman paid on a commissions basis#
who made no sales between October 1 and October 14, 1992 and
4

voluntarily terminated on October 14, 1992, he is not entitled to
receive

additional

prepayment

of

future

commissions.

Upon

termination, the salesman no longer calls on potential customers,
therefore, there is no way he can earn commissions.

When the

salesman has no potential to earn future commissions he is not
entitled to receive nor is his employer obligated to pay him any
prepayment of

future commissions*

There

is nothing

in the

employment agreement that gives Plaintiff that right nor is there
a business practice that justifies such a policy.
The Plaintiff terminated his employment on October 14, 1992.
No prospective, with whom he had been dealing, bought products from
the Defendant during the period October 1 - 1 4 , 1992, nor during
the thirty (30) day period that followed.

Therefore, there is

nothing owed to the Plaintiff on this account.
After being advised that commissioned salesman were entitled
to receive minimum wage, the Defendant paid Plaintiff for 80 hours
work at the minimum wage, minus applicable taxes.
Based upon the foregoing, it is the position of the Defendant
that there is nothing owed to the Plaintiff as a result of his
employment with the Defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests
that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied and that the
5

Defendant's

motion

summary

judgment

filed

herewith

be

jh/

granted.
DATED this

for

A

day of November, 1993. _

//^Thomas/R.

l^onquist

MAILING CERTIFIC
I hereby certify that on this

A

k^

day of November, 1993, I

mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing

to:
Linda Faye Smith
Attorney at Law
c/o University of Utah
College of Law
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
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Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369)
Attorney for Defendant
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
LEE K. SHUSTER,

)

AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. 920016945CV
APPLIED COMPUTER
TECHNIQUES, INC.,

Judge Dennis M. Fuchs

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
ss
)

Vaughn Christensen, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

At all times material to matters pending in the above

entitled matter, affiant was the president and chief executive
officer of the Defendant*
2.

In

said

position,

affiant

has

access

to

all

of

Defendant's business records.
3.

Among said business records, are the records showing

sales made and commissions earned by Plaintiff as well as all
advanced commissions paid to the Plaintiff.
4.

Said records show that during his employment with the

Defendant, Plaintiff earned commissions of $1,831.30 and was paid
advanced commissions of $11,632.86.
5.

The business records of Defendant further show that no

sales were made during the period of October 1, through October 14,
1992, therefore, no commissions were earned by the Plaintiff during
the period.
6.

After Plaintiff terminated his employment, affiant was

informed by the Industrial Commission of Utah that Plaintiff was
entitled to minimum wage for the period October 1, through October
14, 1992, even though he was paid on a commission basis.
7.

As a result, on December 1, 1992 Defendant sent Plaintiff

a check for 80 hours of work at $4.25 an hour, less applicable
taxes.
8.

During

the

thirty

(30) days

following

Plaintiff's

termination of employment, none of his customers purchased products
from the Defendant.
9.

Further affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this /¥

day of November, 1993.

^3^/j^^
Vaughn yChr istensen
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
1993.
NOTABYHJBUC

Shtrte* tamiMki
40 Sou* #00 C u t
S«!tUJc»Cftr,Uttl S4102
My Commnttow Enpif—

M«r is. \m
8TATE OF UTAH

]

/a

day of November,

C7
Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County

TabG

LINDA FAYE SMITH, #4460
Attorney for Plaintiff
C/O University of Utah
College of Law
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
Telephone: 581-4077
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

LEE K. SHUSTER,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Plaintiff,

OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.

AND MEMORAfii&UM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

APPLIED COMPUTER
CiviA No. 920016945
*
*

TECHNIQUES, INC.

Jvjflge Dennis M. Fuchs

Defendant

MATERIAL FACTS -- ADMITTED AND DISPUTED
Plaintiff's

Memorandum

of

Points and Authorities

sets forth

numbered paragraphs (10) of undisputed material facts, with references
to the record (pleadings, exhibits, contract).
identify any of these facts as disputed.1

1

Defendant ACT does not

The Plaintiff's Statement of

Defendant ACT does set forth "facts" it deems "material," but
none appear to specifically controvert Plaintiff's Statement of
Material Fact.

/oe>

Material Facts should be deemed admitted by this Court.2
Defendant ACT has also filed a cross Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff Lee Shuster disputes certain of the facts set forth as
"material" in ACT'S Response and Memorandum. However, Plaintiff Shuster
does not believe that any of the facts he disputes are material to the
issues presented in his Motion for Summary Judgment.

In response to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff submits his Affidavit
and notes he disputes the following:
1. Plaintiff disputes Fact \2 and 13 regarding the source of ACT's
revenues as contrary

to the information he was given during his

employment and unsupported by the record.

(See Affidavit of Lee Shuster

110.)
2.

Plaintiff agrees that Fact 1l describes ACT's business, but

disputes that he was employed to sell "Defendant's products" as stated
in Fact 14.

Plaintiff Lee Shuster was employed only to sell the

accounting software to bottled water distributors, ACT having limited
his duties in accordance with the Employment Agreement 1 1. (See Shuster
Affidavit 14) .
3.
salesman"

Plaintiff disputes that he was hired
(Fact

14) and

that ACT's staff

"as a commissioned

comprised

"two outside

salesmen" (Fact 15) . The Employment Agreement sets forth the nature of
2

Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Code of Judicial Administration
provides: "All material facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall
be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically
controverted
by the opposing party's statement."
(emphasis added)
2

the employment relationship, and its interpretation is a matter of law.
(See Agreement Exhibit A) . There is no support in the record for
characterizing Mr. Shuster as an "outside salesman" and none is cited.
Mr. Shuster worked at ACT'S offices under ACT'S direction during his
employment. (Shuster Affidavit 1 6-9, 12).
4. ACT's Facts \S - \S state that "by agreement" plaintiff received
"commissions" a "draw" or "prepaid commissions", but ACT does not
reference the written Employment Agreement. Plaintiff would dispute that
there was any "agreement" beyond the written Employment Agreement. The
interpretation of the Employment Agreement is a matter of law (not
fact).
5.

(See Employment Agreement, Exhibit A.)
Plaintiff would

dispute

the

figures set

forth

"commissions earned" and "advanced commissions" (Facts \9)

for the
if these

amounts were material. (Shuster Affidavit 1 11 and Attachment #2).
6. Plaintiff would dispute the statement that "plaintiff terminated
his employment" (Facts 18) if it were material. Plaintiff contends that
ACT terminated

the Employment

Agreement

(as provided

for

in the

Agreement 1 13) on October 14, 1992. ACT offered plaintiff Lee Shuster
a new contract that would have involved working for commissions only,
which plaintiff declined. (See Shuster Affidavit 1 5 and correspondence
Exhibit B and Affidavit Attachment #2.)

3

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.

THE FACTS IN DISPUTE ARE NOT MATERIAL TO THE LEGAL QUESTION

IN COUNT I REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
The defendant ACT describes a company whose "life blood" is new sales
and contends that a salesman who has failed to make sales shouldn't be
paid.

Mr. Shuster's Affidavit and letter (Attachment #2) to Vaughn

Christensen, president of ACT, provides a different, complex picture of
the product, pricing, and seasonal sales patterns of ACT.

However, it

is not necessary for this Court to decide if ACT's sales-force was
incompetent or if ACT's accounting software for the bottled water
distribution

industry

was

marginally marketable.

poorly

conceived,

overpriced

and

only

The only question for this Court is what the

Employment Agreement means.

II.

THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT IS UNAMBIGUOUS, AND AS A MATTER OF LAW

ENTITLES MR. SHUSTER TO OUTSTANDING GROSS PAY AS PRAYED FOR IN
COUNT I OF THE COMPLAINT
The Employment Agreement itself is admitted to by both parties. If
it is unambiguous (which the Plaintiff believes it is), the Court may
enter judgment as a matter of law.3 Faulkner

v.

Farnsworth

665 P.2d

1292, 1293 (Utah, 1983).
Defendant ACT seeks to characterize any and all payments to be made

3

If the contract is ambiguous, then this Court should deny
summary judgment and await a trial where parol evidence can be
considered in understanding it.
4

to Mr, Shuster as "commissions" or "prepaid commissions" dependent upon
sales. Nevertheless, the Agreement unambiguously provides a schedule of
guaranteed monthly payments:
"If commissions earned do not equal the draw per month as outlined
above, Employer shall add that amount necessary
to cause
Employee's
gross pay to equal the monthly amount shown, such amount to be
considered a draw against future commissions. " Employment Agreement
5 6, Exhibit A (emphasis added).
While the Employer can recapture the "draw" in certain circumstances,
the Agreement never permits the employer to pay the employee less that
the defined "gross pay."

When commissions earned rise above a certain

level ($2500 per month) the Employer is permitted to recapture the
"draw." (Employment Agreement 16)

After termination, the Employer is

entitled to recapture any "commissions" earned during the 30 days
following termination to repay any outstanding draws which may exist.
(Employment Agreement 15.D.)

But there is no provision for paying the

employee less than the "draw" or "gross pay" provided for on the
schedule. The Agreement never sets forth an exception to the Employer's
obligation to pay this monthly amount.
Defendant ACT argues that it is illogical to require ACT to make
"prepayment of future commissions" upon a salesman's termination, since
"there is no way he can earn future commissions." Memorandum p.5. But
this is incorrect.

The Agreement allows the salesman to receive

commissions on sales made for 30 days after he ceases to be employed.
(Employment Agreement 1 5.D). So a "prepayment" of future commissions
which might be earned on sales during the month following termination is
5

perfectly logical; and it is required under this Agreement.
Not

only

is

this

the

only

logical,

plain

and

unambiguous

interpretation of the contract--it is the only interpretation that would
render the contract legal.

If an employer pays nothing to an employee

who worked full-time, at the employer's offices under the employer's
direction for two weeks, simply because the employee sold none of the
employer's $4000 accounting packages during that two weeks; the Employer
will violate state and federal minimum wage law.

See 29 U.S.C.A. §201

et. seg. (Fair Labor Standards Act) and Utah Code Ann. §34-40-101 et.
seg. (Utah Minimum Wage Act). Contrary to ACT'S arguments, Mr. Shuster
is entitled to be paid for his two weeks of work.
ACT'S Memorandum refers to Mr. Shuster as one of two "outside
salesmen" but makes no reference to anything in the record to support
this characterization.4

There is no support in the record or elsewhere

to characterize Mr. Shuster (or the other salesman) as an "outside
salesman."
wage

Federal law, which exempts "outside salesmen" from minimum

law, defines

an

"outside

salesman" as an employee

"who is

customarily and regularly engaged away from his employer's place or
places of business. . . . " 29 C.F.R. §541.5(a).

The federal regulatory

interpretations (Part B) state:
"This requirement is based on the obvious connotation of the word
'outside' in the term 'outside salesman.' It would obviously lie
beyond the scope of the Administrator's authority that "outside
salesman" should be construed to include inside salesmen. . . .29
4

Both federal and state law exempt an "outside salesman" from
the minimum wage law. See 29 U.S.C.A. §213 and Utah Code Ann. §3440-104.
6

C.F.R. §541.502(a)"
"Characteristically the outside salesman is one who makes his sales
at his customer's place of business. This is the reverse of sales
made by mail or telephone. . . ."29 C.F.R. §541.502(b)
Mr. Shuster worked full-time, every week, for ACT at ACT's place of
business, 772 East 330 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Not only was he
regularly present, but he was required to be present at the employer's
place of business during normal business hours. He called customers by
telephone, demonstrated products via modem, mailed solicitations and
developed marketing plans all at ACT's business offices.
Affidavit

1

6-9,

12

and

Attachment

#2.)

The

(Shuster

unsupported

mischaracterization of Mr. Shuster as an "outside salesman" should not
be permitted to confuse the issue.
The plain meaning--and

the only legal interpretation--of the

Employment Agreement is that ACT was required to and failed to pay Mr.
Shuster the "gross pay" for his full-time work during his final two
weeks of employment at ACT.

III.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR CIVIL PENALTIES UNDER THE UTAH PAYMENT OF

WAGE ACT IS NOT DISPUTED.
Plaintiff's second cause of action is based upon ACT's violation of
the Utah Payment of Wages Act. The UPWA requires prompt payment of wages
at

termination.

This cause of action does not depend upon the

7

interpretation of the Employment Agreement.5

If ACT owed Mr. Shuster

any wages at all (even "minimum wages") ACT violated the UPWA for paying
nothing for 45 days.
Defendant ACT'S Response and Memorandum does not controvert this
point at all.

Accordingly, this Court should order judgment for the

Plaintiff under Count II for ACT'S violation of the Utah Payment of Wage
Act.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and set forth more fully in the
Amended Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff Lee Shuster requests this Court
to enter Judgment for him on all counts in accordance with the Complaint
and his Motion for Summary Judgment.

LINDA FAYE SMITH

&-

jinda Faye 'Sm^fch (Bar No. 4460)
Attorney ror Plaintiff
Lee K. Shuster
c/o University of Utah
College of Law
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
Telephone: (801) 581-4077

5

The amount of the civil penalty depends upon whether this
Court finds the plaintiff entitled to wages under the Agreement or
entitled to minimum wage.
8

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the Reply
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment,

and Affidavit of Plaintiff Lee Shuster (together with Attachments #1 and
#2) were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 1st day of December, 1993, to:

Thomas R. Blonguist (0369)
Attorney for Defendant
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

iiida Faye Sofft.
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LINDA FAYE SMITH, #4460
Attorney for Plaintiff
C/O University of Utah
College of Law
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
Telephone: 581-4077
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

LEE K. SHUSTER,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
*

vs.

PLAINTIFF
LEE K. SHUSJTER

*
*

APPLIED COMPUTER
TECHNIQUES, INC.

Civil No. 920016945
Judgs Dennis M. Fuchs

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

*

)

SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Lee K. Shuster, being first duly sworn on oath, hereby state as
follows:
1.

I am the plaintiff in the above-named case.

2.

Prior to my employment at ACT I had been employed as a sales

person in the computer industry for over 5 years, earning between
$35,000 and $50,000 annually.

3.

I was employed by ACT from on or about March 2, 1992 until

October 15, 1992 in accordance with the Employment Agreement attached to
the Complaint, No separate or different agreement existed between myself
and ACT.
4.

I was employed solely to market ACT'S accounting software (and

related hardware) to bottled water distributors.

Although ACT sold

other products and services to new and existing customers, my sales
responsibilities

were limited by ACT

to marketing

the accounting

software packages to bottled water distributors in certain geographical
areas.
5.

My employment at ACT ended when Mr. Christensen, ACT'S

president, informed me that ACT was revoking the existing Employment
Agreement. ACT's President, Mr. Christensen, offered me a new agreement
which I understood to involve working for "straight commissions."

I

declined this offer as set forth in my letters. (See Exhibits B and
Attachment #2.)
6.

During my employment I worked on a full-time basis at ACT's

offices at 772 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84106.

I was

required, by the terms of my employment and by ACT's president Vaughn
Christensen, to be present at ACT's offices during normal business
hours; and I was not permitted to work at my home or elsewhere except as
specifically approved by Mr. Christensen.
7.

I can recall only three occasions when I did leave ACT's
2

offices on business: once to call upon a local customer, once to
complete some promotional materials on my computer at home, and during
the final two weeks of my employment to accompany Mr. Christensen to a
trade show in Cincinnati, Ohio.
8.

The sales solicitation work I performed for ACT was at Mr.

Christensen's

direction

and

in accordance

with Mr.

Christensen's

marketing scheme, and included primarily telephone solicitation and
selling.
9.

In addition to the sales solicitation work, I performed other

services to improve ACT'S ability to market its accounting software to
bottled water distributors. Certain of the other services I performed
for ACT are discussed in my letter to ACT, attached here as Attachment
#2. During my employment my co-salesman and I undertook a comprehensive
analysis

of

prospects.

ACT'S

sales

and

marketing

strategies,

pricing,

and

This analysis had been requested by Mr. Christensen, as

mentioned in the final paragraph of his Memorandum attached hereto as
Attachment #1.

The initial analysis of ACT'S product and marketing

strategy is also contained in my Letter to Mr. Christensen dated October
14, 1992 and attached hereto as Attachment #2.

This letter is a true

and accurate statement of my activities and my observations.
10.
Mr.

My understanding of ACT'S revenues and expenses, based upon

Christensen's

statements

Attachment #2, page 5.

to me, is contained

in my letter,

On information and belief I dispute that ACT
3

received 80% of its income from new sales. However, I do not think this
is relevant to my claim for unpaid wages.
11.

My

objections

to ACT'S

accounting

of

"my"

sales and

"commissions11 is set forth on page 6 of the letter Attachment #2. On
information and belief, ACT made sales to customers in the territory ACT
had assigned to me pursuant to the Agreement. ACT did not refer these
customers to me and ACT gave me no credit for such sales.

I believe

these actions were in violation of the Employment Agreement.

However,

this dispute makes no difference in this case for unpaid wages.
12.

During the last two weeks I worked for ACT (October 1 to

October 15), I worked more than full-time, and well over 80 hours.
During most of that period

I worked at ACT'S offices conducting

telephone solicitation. However, at ACT'S direction I also accompanied
Mr. Christensen and the other salesman, Gene Castle, to Cincinnati, Ohio
to a trade show of bottled water distributors. This involved being away
from home for approximately three days, including Friday evening, all
day Saturday and Saturday evening, and returning to Salt Lake City on a
Sunday.

During this period I prepared

for this trade show, met

prospects at the show, and followed up prospective sales after the show.
During this time I also learned that a prospective customer had selected
a

competing

product,

based

installation and training.

solely

upon

lower

cost

and

faster

(See letter Attachment #2, p. 3). In

addition, in consultation with my fellow salesman I completed a draft
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analysis of ACT's marketing of its accounting software to the bottled
water distribution industry. This analysis is contained in my letter of
October 14, 1992, Attachment #2. This summarizes the work I did for ACT
during my final two weeks of employment for which ACT originally paid me
nothing, and now has paid me only minimum wage for 80 hours of work.

DATED this 1st day of December, 1993

k//^

A qW k^> 4^

Lee K. Shuster

The foregoing Affidavit was subscribed and sworn before me on this
1st day of December, 1993.

Notary Public
My Commissions Expires:

I /@55^
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ATTACHMENT #1

MEMORANDUM
To:

Lee Shuster

Froa:

Vaughn Christensen

Date:

October 14, 1992

Subject:

Eaployaent Agreeaent

Lee, Gene wrote ae a letter today regarding our conversations last
Wednesday and Thursday, As Gene is still unsure of the changes Linda and I
are taking to the agreement, I thought a aeao to you clearly explaining these
changes would be in order. Thus, the following is a recap of the conversation
on October 7f 1992, between you, Linda, and ae regarding the changes to your
Eaployaent Agreement, which we feel are necessary due to your inadequate sales
results to date:
1. Draw cap.
The provisions in paragraph 6 for issuing you draws
against future coaaissions earned will be modified such that the maximum
aaount issued to you in the fori of draws against future coaaissions will be
established at $13,000.00. If the rate of sales has not substantially changed
by November 15, 1992, we should Beet again to determine what other peasures we
can eaploy to correct this situation.
2. Recovery of outstanding draws.
The provisions in paragraph 6 for
recovering the outstanding draw balance will be •odified such that earned
coaaissions which exceed $750.00 in any semimonthly pay period will be applied
as a credit to the outstanding draw balance, thus reducing it.
3. The above changes will becoie effective Wednesday, October 7, 1992.
Thus, it was our intention to teninate the Eaployaent Agreement as it existed
on October 7, and execute a new one incorporating the above changes as of that
saae date. As Linda was unable to sake the changes prior to her departure for
Berauda, I will take the changes and incorporate thea into a new agreeeent
which will go into effect today, October 14.
Further, I suggested that you spend soae tiae contemplating the
potential sales in the bottled water aarket, our sales and aarketing strategy,
pricing, etc., with the goal of suggesting ways in which this undesirable
condition of inadequate sales aay be rectified. I asked you to get back with
Linda and ae at your convenience, but no later than Wednesday, October 14,
with your suggestions. If needed you could discuss these issues with Gene. I
await your input.

ATTACHMENT #2
1337 East Yale Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84105-1612

October 14, 1992

Dear Vaughn:
I am writing this to confirm your actions of last week, and to respond to your request that I
propose a "counter-offer11 or give you my suggestions about your business and my relationship with it
First, during meetings on Wednesday and again on Thursday, you informed me that as of
November 15, 1992, Applied Computer Techniques was terminating the Employment Agreement (dated
March 2, 1992) with me. (See paragraph 13). You further offered to re-employ me, effective November
15, 1992, provided that I would agree to a major change in my compensation. Basically, you informed
me that you would no longer guarantee a gross pay of $1500 per month, as Paragraph 6 of the
Employment Agreement does. Rather, you would pay me additional monies only after and if I made new
commissionable sales.
You also gave me a Draw and Commission Report which indicated the following regarding my
81/2 months of employment (as of November 15, 1992):

ACT Gross Income from my sales (est)
ACT Gross Profit from my Sales

$12,208.00
$9,156.00

(after 25% "costs" subtracted)
Compensation paid to me

$13,464.16

"Loss" you calculate from my employment

$(4307.91)

Commissions (@20% of Gross Profits)

$1,831.30

You explained that under the proposed new arrangement, after I made a new sale I would be
entitled to commission at the existing rate (20%) up to $1500.00 per month, but that any commission
over $1500.00 per month would be retained by ACT to repay the "draw" I have received. (In the existing
contract, commissions are recaptured by ACT only when they exceed $2500.00 per month.) You further
explained that after I had made sales, earned commissions, and paid some of the draw back to ACT, I
would again be entitled to "draw" on future commissions, but a permanent cap on draw of $13,464.16
(the total amount paid to me as of November 15) would be placed on any amount advanced to me in
this way. In the short run, I could expect to receive payments only when and to the extent I earned
commissions.

You also took the same steps (terminating the Employment Agreement and offering this new
agreement) with the other salesman ACT employs, Gene Castle. In neither instance did you indicate
that we salesmen had failed to carry out our obligations under the contract in a competent manner, (nor
had you previously so indicated). You did not offer any new benefit to us in consideration for the
financial sacrifice you are asking us to make. In fact, your offer to "re-employ" us indicated that you
believe we are competent sales people, and you told Gene and me that we were the best sales people
you have ever had. Rather, your stated concern was that ACTs expenses were too high in light of its
income, and your desire was to cut the expense of paying the personnel that perform sales work or to
"motivate" higher sales by the new straight commission compensation arrangement.
Let me explain how this situation appears from my perspective, and why your offer to reemploy me is unrealistic and unreasonable. In summary, the commissions I would likely earn (given an
unchanged product mix, pricing structure and marketing strategy, and in light of ACTs sales history) total
between $5000 and $10,000 annually. It does not seem a reasonable or suitable plan for my
dependents or me to pursue a chance of earning between $2.50 per hour and minimum wage, as is the
most likely scenario if I remain at ACT.
Let me explain how I have come to these conclusions. First when I was a candidate for this
job in November and December, 1991, I asked you about the sales prospects, the company's history,
and my potential earnings. As I told you, I had earned between $35,000 and $65,000 annually
(averaging $49,000) over the past 4 years as a salesperson in the computer industry and I would require
such earnings to meet child support obligations, debt obligations, relocation expenses and to provide for
basic living expenses. You assured me that it was quite possible for me to realize earnings in that
range. I asked about the company's sales history, and learned that I would need to sell five to six times
as many systems as the prior salesmen for my previous average earnings to be matched. You indicated
that the prior salesperson was not making enough telephone contacts, and you explained that such
increase in sales and earnings was possible by making more contacts each day and because the
market for your product was expanding. You also told me you had purchased a data base of prospective
customers, which would make telephone sales a viable approach. As you know, I accepted a position
with your firm (leaving a job whose base salary was $35,000 guaranteed, plus 40% commissions on all
products sold nationally) in order to relocate to Utah for personal reasons. I hoped your predictions about
your business and its prospects were accurate.
Now that I have been employed by ACT for seven months, I am in a better position to analyze
your marketing needs and your business's prospects.
It now appears that during the first 24 months (October 1989 to October 1991) after introducing
the product ACT sold approximately 30 units. This averages 15 units per year. You told me that the
average new sale grossed $5000 for ACT, so 15 units per year would yield ACT $75,000 in income. If I
have correctly understood this history it seems that sales over the last 12 months (September 1991 to
September 1992) are consistent with historical patterns, with approximately 15 units sold, despite a 33%
increase in the cost of the standard system during this past year. The conclusion I draw from this
analysis is: despite the fact that Gene and I have followed your instructions for calling dozens of
prospects each day, overall sales have not increased, but are in fact on track with respect to historical
performance of the product My conclusion is that the market for this product is more of a factor in
determining sales potential than strictly increasing the number of calls made per month in sales
prospecting activities.
If this historical pattern continues unaltered (as it appears it will), the commissions available
for new sales will be approximately $15,000.00 per year. (If this is divided between two salespeople, it
will be $7,500 per year for each.) It is your belief that we can influence customers to buy our product by
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following the "procedure/needs/criteria" selling method, and doing so with large numbers of prospects
You hired two salesmen (instead of one) thinking that twice as much telephoning would result in three to
four times as many sales. To date, this has not been the result.
Unfortunately, the economics of the market are more complicated Basic marketplace
economics teaches that as a products price is increased, fewer purchases will be made. There is an
ideal price for a product which will maximize income I am not clear how you have determined the
pricing of our products to new customers (particularly how you determined that a 33% increase in entry
level pricing during this year was prudent.) However, I know that our product's comparatively high pnce
substantially reduces the number of potential customers who are willing and able to buy our product
The current targeted market (Route-based bottled water distributors) is a narrowly defined
niche. The largest segment of the market are distributors owned by producer/bottlers; and typically they
have previously obtained accounting packages from their corporate MIS departments. So, without a
vastly different approach and product, they are rarely prospects. The other companies that distnbute
bottled water are small to medium-sized companies.
The small companies often are "one-person" operations. They are not computerized, consider
the purchase of a computer a major expenditure, and are shocked with the S4000.00 pnce for accounting
software plus an additional $1500.00 for training. They will not purchase our product until they are
convinced of the value of a computer, assisted to fully utilize the computer in their business (e.g. word
processing as well as accounting and route management), and then will only buy an accounting system
such as ours if they have the money and it is cost effective given the size of their business. Thus far, we
have not tried to offer a "full-service" computer consulting business to introduce these customers to costeffective benefit of computerized accounting and route management functions. Without such an approach,
these companies are not realistic prospects.
Then there are the medium-sized distributers who usually have computerized. Many already
have accounting packages. Some use "off-the-shelf1 general accounting or spreadsheet products
available for as little as $50.00. While ours is more industry-specific and does include route management
functions, our product can be 100 times more expensive, and many of these potential customers are not
convinced that the greater efficiency we offer them will translate into savings, while others simply do not
have the capital to purchase our package, even when they are convinced of the potential savings and want
to purchase our product
Finally, there are a very few firms who have sufficient capital and appreciation for a fully
automated accounting and route management system. But they are also doing their homework and
looking closely at our competition. Mountain Valley Water, of Miami, Florida was such a potential
customer. Yet at the last moment Robert Levin, a very respected and influential leader in the bottled
water industry, decided to purchase a package from one of our competitors. Although our prices were the
same (after our $1590 "free" software promotion), Mr. Levin openly told me our competitor was willing to
train his people on-site at no additional cost In contrast your policy is to charge the customer the cost of
your wife's travel and per diem expenses to Florida and $200 per day for training, (or under my contract I
could take the cost of air travel and living expenses out of my $750.00 commissions.) Basically,
purchasing our competitor's product saved this customer about $1500.00 - our product cost about 38%
more than our competitor's did. Moreover, our competitor was willing to install the system immediately,
where our policy is to tell the customer it will take one or two months to arrange installation and a training
visit by your wife. Furthermore, Mr. Levin told me "Lee, you conducted the product demonstrations in a
highly professional manner and answered all my questions about the product and services in a way that
directly showed me how your product would meet my needs." In a nutshell, Mr. Levin went elsewhere
based on the higher start-up cost, not my role in the direct selling process.
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Accordingly, even the prospects who are very motivated to buy, may choose to buy from a
competitor because the package we offer costs more for what the customer gets. Similarly, there are
customers wno are willing and able to spend significant sums for accounting software, but who have
requested design differences from our package. These requests have included (but are not limited too):
Assets and Depreciation module, Work Order/Service module. Manufacturing modules, and Telemarketing
module. (My potential customers whose needs we could not accommodate included Vermont Hidden
Spring, Serve-A-Care, K and K Water, and of course the entire Culhgan Treatment and Conditioning family
of companies.) if we will not accommodate these desires as oroauct enhancements at a reasonable price
and time frame, the customer will (and does) simply go elsewhere.
This has been a rather extended way of saying that sales are not directly, proportionally or linearly
related to time and effort spent selling over the telephone. From having spoken to hundreds of potential
customers, it is my impression that our product will only appeal to a certain niche segment of the routebased, bottled water industry. It would seemingly make sense for ACT to have a business plan that
accurately defines and describes that "target market" If ACT were to perform such analysis, you may be
able to establish a coherent plan to increase sales and/or profitability. I am firmly convinced that your
present approach of requiring a high volume of calls and of paying the sales force a straight commission to
"incent" more sales will have no positive effect upon sales.
A marketing director would certainly study the prospect database ACT has at hand, and which our
contract requires you to furnish. (Para. 12.) As you know, that data base had 1200 prospects in my territory,
all of whom had been contacted by mid-August However, over 50% of that database were not prospective
customers (because they were out-of-business, branch offices, etc). This leaves 600 to 800 prospects per
sales person to now re-contact. Since I averaged 25 calls a day, I could re-contact all the customers on this
list once every six weeks to see if they were now interested in our product Despite repeated requests from
Gene and me, you have not provided additional, updated marketing resources in this area. (Commercially
available lists, based on U.S. and Canadian listings of S.I.C Code 5499-03; Bottled and Bulk Water
companies equal 4000 listings; with another 4000 listings for Office Coffee Service companies.
A marketing director would also study the competitive products in the market, and assess our
product (as to characteristics, price, etc.) in light of its competition. Since you have been selling this
product for three years (and I have been with ACT for seven months), I expected that you would be able to
inform me of the unique qualities of our product in comparison with our competition. Nevertheless, most of
the information on file about our competition has been acquired during the past months through my
voluntary efforts.
A marketing director would also analyze the sales history of the company. It appears that there
were few (3) sales in the first year of operation, and then a flurry of sales clustered in September 1990 January 1991. The same level of sales did not occur from September 1991 - January 1992. What was
conducive to these sales in autumn of 1990 and has not been as conducive since? It could be our change
in pricing. It could be a competitor's reduction of price. It could be a national economic downturn. It could
be that the market is saturated. It could be that customer lists were fresh two years ago, and are played out
now. In the fast-paced computer industry, it could be the recent availability of low-cost, off-the-shelf,
simple-to-use accounting packages coupled with the drastic reduction in the price of hardware. Since I had
not been asked to analyze this phenomenon until last week, I relied upon your analysis and complied with
your strategy of high- volume "telsell" calling. I do not know how ACT operated in fall, 1990 (e.g. price and
training costs, customer lists, method of contact, advertising), but it would be wise to ask what is different
today. Moreover, ACT should carefully survey and analyze the reasons prospects have given for not being
interested in our product ACT needs to understand the reasons for sales currently being lost to
competitors. A statistical analysis of the market using our own data would assist ACT to better target
customers and perhaps redesign or repackage the product and services sold.
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A marketing director should also study the reasons why many of our customers prefer not to buy
computer hardware from us along with the software package (whether they already own a computer or can
simply acquire one more cheaply than at our prices). ACT should also study the profitability of "add-on"
sales or consulting services to existing customers, compared with new sales to new customers. Presently,
there is little or no concerted effort (or marketing focus) to promote sales and the high cost effectiveness of
additions (e.g. handheld terminals) to current customers. Moreover, the fact that the salesman may receive
NO commission for such sales discourages the development of this highly profitable market.
Gene Castle and I have been instructed to make a large volume of calls to prospective
customers, to avoid the issue of price, and to convince the customers that our product is "better." We have
not been previously asked to perform a market analysis and we have not been provided with the relevant
data to do so. Nevertheless, we have suggested new marketing ideas. And our ideas have generally been
met with resistance or rejection. Gene studied the sales history, and learned that ACT has rarely sold a
new system during the summer months. (It is the busy season for the bottled water industry.) With this
information Gene and I designed a "summer special" where a "free computer or software" was sold with the
accounting package and delivery and payment were deferred until fall. As a result, ACT enjoyed significant
(5 or 6 units) "summer sales." We also got free public relations coverage from Mountain Valley Water, a
major nationwide distributor of bottled water. However, this marketing approach was financed by Gene and
me - the "free computer" was paid for out of our commissions.
I have personally tried to expand and diversify our sales approach by loaning ACT three modems
for conducting long-distance telephone-based product demonstrations and avoiding expensive travel to
prospect sites. Gene and I designed a demoguide booklet to assist in the demonstration process. We
saved the company time and money by making available a complete desktop publishing system including:
computer scanner, clip art and graphics software, fonts and high-quality graphic laser printing producing an
innovative marketing mailer for promoting hand-held sales. When you said you could not afford a
commercial spreadsheet program for faster preparations of proposals and cost justification studies, I gladly
donated a registerable copy of a leading spreadsheet program. All these efforts seem to have been
unrecognized.
Frankly, it appears that ACT has been pursuing the same sales approach for some time, with the
same pricing structure (albeit having increased entry-level prices 33% this past year). If ACT continues the
same marketing patterns, it is likely to get the same sales results. ACT needs to analyze the facts and to
creatively consider a variety of new and innovative ways to service the industry if its profits and growth rate
are to increase.
Of course, ACTs fiscal analysis should encompass more than the market for increasing new
sales. It should also consider ACTs costs and better ways to be more cost effective. You have told me that
ACTs gross income for the past three years has been approximately: $200,000 in 1989, $225,000 for 1990,
and $310,000 for 1991. If I have understood these figures accurately, it seems that the majority of ACTs
earnings have not been from new sales, but from sales to existing customers (annual support fees, income
from the sales of accounting forms, custom programming, sales of add-on peripherals and network
components). Thus, ACTs gross income from new sales over this period (approximately $160,000) has
represented less than 30% of ACTs total income. While new sales may be necessary to support future
growth, it does not appear that new sales of the current product have ever been the major source of income
for ACT. It also appears that the new sales-to-date in 1992 are entirely consistent with the sales record in
prior years at this point of the year, as I believe you said earnings were only down 3% over last year.
Although I certainly cannot make sense of everything you told us in this regard, you clearly
informed Gene and me that the changes in the contract were necessitated by a budget crisis. You explained
that it cost you almost $16,000.00 per month "just to keep the doors open," that you and your wife Linda had
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not paid yourselves but $1500.00 salary all year, and that you only had a bit over $100 00 in your personal

checking account Surely, if sales to new customers were your only income, you would be in debt well over
$100,000 for 1992 alone. If circumstances are actually that desperate, perhaps a major scale-back is in
order: a return to the mom-and-pop style operation, with you and your wife doing all sales and marketing,
technical support, business and financial planning, and secretarial support; and hiring the needed
programming staff on a contracted basis On the other hand, it seems that if your gross sales this yeai are
similar to your gross sales last year ($300,000), having expenses of $16,000 per month ($192,000/year) will
still leave a net profit of $108,000. Similarly, I must wonder about your decision to recently hire a secretary at
an annual salary of nearly $20,000 while you are laying off salesmen who work for as little as $18,000 I also
question the wisdom under such financial conditions of spending several thousand dollars recently to attend
an industry trade show that yielded, very few, if any new qualified prospects Finally, I wonder why you are
focusing upon cutting expenses at a time when your time might be more productively spent helping Gene
close an historic sale.
As you know, Gene's soon-to-be-accomplished sale in Chicago is a unique and very desirable
customer. That customer is a very large distributor (probably one of the largest independent distributors in
the nation) who has focused on down-sizing their route management and accounting system and is seeking
to change to a networked PC-based system with hand-held terminals. Accordingly, our largest competitor
(who sells similar accounting packages for mainframes, not PC-based networks) was not an issue. Because
of the prospects size, the price of our system is not a disadvantage And the customer will be buying not only
our software, but also additional high-margin products (hand-helds) and services (custom programming). If
Gene succeeds in landing this sale, its size and profitability will be of historical dimension for ACT, possibly
grossing more in one sale than all of fiscal year-1990 earnings Therefore, I am baffled that contract
termination and lay-offs are the topic of the week, rather than a company-wide celebration for Gene's (and
the entire ACT team's) truly amazing accomplishment
I find myself wondering if your desire to terminate Gene's and my contracts in the autumn (when
sales historically pick up) isn't part of a disturbing pattern. I have been told that all prior sales people have
worked less than a year and have left in the autumn. After they are gone, you close any sales that may be
pending. Since salesmen are not entitled to any commissions for sales made more than 30 days after the
end of their employment, you need not pay them anything further for the contacts they had made. Being
understaffed every fall when sales pick up may be a good way to save paying both draw and commissions to
the sales force.
Another questionable practice is your failure to provide new salespeople with all appropriate "client
and prospective client information" (Para. 12. A) in the "designated geographical area" (Para. 3. A.) you have
assigned to that salesperson. For example, there were three sales made in my territory during my
employment at ACT to clients I had no knowledge or information about I believe that under the Agreement
those clients should have been referred to me so that I could have had or shared responsibility for those sales
and for follow-up sales to this "existing customer."
In conclusion, you should understand that I will consider myself to have been laid off by ACT for
purely economic reasons as of November 15, 1992. For the reasons set forth above, I do not believe that I
can accept your new offer of providing me the opportunity to work for whatever commissions I may earn after
that date, since the likelihood is that I will earn less than minimum wage under that scenario. I do believe
you need to hire or contract with a marketing director and/or small business financial planner. I would be
willing to discuss or undertake a market analysis of ACT on a short-term, independent contract.
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Since I have based my decision on the facts as I understand them (and as I have set forth above),
please let me know whether I have misunderstood any facts I would appreciate a prompt, written response

Sincerely,

Lee K. Shuster
Account Representative

Tab I

1

doors open.

2

that he'd received $11,000 in advance

For example, you saw our affidavit

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. BLONQUIST:

5

showing

commissions.

Right.
And he's earned commissions of a

thousand.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. BLONQUIST:

I saw that.
And you just can't stay in

8

business under those terms and conditions.

9

did was suggest that these, that there be a change and as

And so what we

10

a result of that, this man terminated, and our position is

11

that when he terminated, then his advance

12

commissions

13

further as an advance.

14

against

terminated and we don't owe him anything

In answer to the Court's question, the question

15

then arose, do we owe him for the period of time that he

16

did work even though he didn't make any sales?

17

Industrial Commission advised my clients —

18

involved at the time —

19

agreement and even though it provides commissions, if the

20

man did work for you, you'll owe him minimum wage.

21

paid him the minimum wage for the two-week period minus

22

the taxes, and as far as we were concerned, that

23

have resolved the matter.

24

course, that that isn't the case.

25

THE COURT:

And the

I wasn't

that even though there was an

So we

should

But their position is, of

How do you get around the penalty

1

though, even if you say it should be minimum wage, how do

2

you get around the penalty that it wasn't paid on time

3

according to the statutes?

4

MR. BLONQUIST:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. BLONQUIST:

Well --

Why isn't there a penalty there?
Well, all we can say is

7

ignorance in the law is no excuse, Your Honor, but as soon

8

as we were told by the Industrial Commission that that was

9

the case, we paid it.

Now if you want to slap our hands

10

for that, hey, we didn't do it right, but we certainly did

11

take care of the matter as promptly as we were advised by

12

the commission and actually informed as to the status, the

13

position that the Industrial Commission took in those

14

matters, but prior to that time my client didn't know.

15
16

THE COURT:

Okay, that helps me better

understand your position.

Okay thank you.

17

Did you find something?

18

MS. SMITH:

Well, no, I don't find it in the

19

statute, but I did bring a complimentary -- courtesy copy

20

to The Court of the Smith v. Batchelor case which is --

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BLONQUIST:

I'm looking at the

—

-- which is a, a case that the

23

Supreme Court decided just a couple of years ago and it

24

was filed in the District Court

25

THE COURT:

—

Do you think I can read this without
7

1

regard to subsection D or 5D; or whether

2

that plaintiff

3

and the motion and the memorandum, grounds

4

judgment .

5

the Court

really has shown, based on the

feels

affidavits

for summary-

In regard -- I have to be honest with you -- in

6

regard to who was bad in the company and whose fault it

7

was, I'm not sure that that has any bearing on the Court's

8

decision whatsoever.

9

contract that existed between the parties.

Some bearing

10

may be whether defendant quit or was forced

to resign

11

based on all of the sudden a unilateral changing of

12

employment

13

commission versus straight commission, depending on the

14

affidavits.

15

dispute.

16

Court has to consider.

17

The question is an employment

contract from gross sales, you know, subject to

Obviously that seems to be a point of

I'm not sure that that's a point here that the

What I want to do is go back over the

employment

18

contract, go back over this, make sure that I do feel that

19

I have jurisdiction

20

either of you can find anything that either

21

positively I do or I don't, I'd be interested

22

give you ten days to provide that to the Court.

23

than that, I want to go back over it and make a

24

determination as to whether

25

almost my opinion that partial summary

in the matter.

If anybody else —

if

says
in that, and
But other

the Court, you know, it's
judgment can be

1

granted, although I'm not doing that, I'm

just trying to

2

give you an idea of where I am, and it would be a question

3

of whether the Court feels that a partial

4

should be based on minimum wage or should be based on the

5

guaranteed gross income as per the

summary

judgment

contract.

6

I'm a little hesitant

7

find that the employee -- or the employer

8

responsibility

9

nothing in 3428 or section 34 that appears to me as if

to say that this court can

to pay and acted in good

had no

faith.

There was

10

good faith has anything to do with the penalties.

11

just, really it gets paid or it doesn't get paid and

12

are the penalties that are imposed

13

MR. BLONQUIST:

It's
these

if it isn't paid.

I understand

that, Your Honor,

14

and I was being very candid with the Court

15

your

in answering

question.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. BLONQUIST:

18

THE COURT:

YES.
Those are the facts.

So the biggest question in the

19

Court's mind is maybe an interpretation

20

looking at what figure the Court should be looking at.

21

MR. BLONQUIST:

of the contract

And our position

in

is as I stated

22

that we think it's the minimum wage, and we paid, we paid

23

late, and if we're entitled to be penalized,

24
25

THE COURT:

I understand

that.

so be it.

The other

issue

would be the Court will reserve the issue of attorney's
22
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

LEE SHUSTER,
Plaintiff,
VS.
APPLIED COMPUTER TECHNIQUES,
INC.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 920016945 CV
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs

This matter having come before the Court on both
Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment and the
Court having heard arguments and reviewed the memorandums as
submitted hereby:
A)

Denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and

B)

Grants Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment for the

following reasons:
1.

There was a valid contract between the parties.

2.

The contract called for wages to be paid to

Plaintiff in the amount of $1,500 per month.
3.

That at the time Plaintiff terminated his

employment he was due wages as per the contract.
4.

That Section D of the employment contract would

only apply if commissions were due and owing.
5.

That Defendant wrote the contract and therefore is

bound by its terms and its interpretation.
6.

That Plaintiff did not pay the wages due Defendant

upon termination.

7.

That Plaintiff is entitled to a penalty of 60 days

wages as per the statute.
8.

That Plaintiff is entitled to the contract amount

and not minimum wage.
Therefore the Court grants judgment in the amount of $410.00
prayed for in the complaint and the penalty of $3,000.00 as
prayed for in the complaint and attorneys fees as provided in the
statute.

Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees as prayed for by the

affidavit.

Defendant shall have 10 days to challenge the

attorney fees and request a hearing if appropriate.

Plaintiff is

to submit a judgment for the Court's signature.
Dated this _//

day of February, 1994.

-2M-?

•ire'MrFuchs
C i r c u i t Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a copy of the above Memorandum
Decision on this l£th day of February, 1994, to:
THOMAS R. BLONQUIST
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

LINDA FAYE SMITH
C/O UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
COLLEGE OF LAW
Salt Lake City, UT 84112

w

Deputy Cle
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
T LAKE DEPARTMENT

LEE K. SHUSTER,

*
*
*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

FINDINGS Of*' FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

Civj4 No. 920016945

APPLIED COMPUTER
TECHNIQUES, INC.

*
*
*

Defendant

The

above-captioned

v P U d g e 1.1e 1111 ,ii*i M , I«" u (• h s

matter

came

on

for hearing

both

the

Plaintiff's and the Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment on
February 2nd, iyiM, i in1 Honor dole Dennis M

Kuclis presiding. The

parties having filed motions and affidavits, and the court having
reviewed the files and

pleadings contained therein and having

heard oral argumen

3 rind i nl ei s i I

1 1 o w ii LK.|[

FINDINGS OF FACT
These material facts have ^

r

been contested by

defendant ACT
e fo.11 owing

and are undisputed,
findings:
1.

The parti es entered into a valid contract for employment

1

on or about February 26, 1992, a copy of which is attached to the
Complaint as Exhibit A.
2.

From February 26, 1992 to October 14, 1992 the plaintiff

Mr. Shuster worked for the defendant ACT, "devoting all his time and
energy during normal business hours" to ACT'S business.
3. From February 26, 1992 to September 30, 1992, ACT paid Mr.
Shuster the "gross pay" provided for under Paragraph 6 of the
Employment Agreement, since the commissions earned never exceeded
such "gross pay."
4. The employment relationship ended on October 15, 1992. At
that time Mr. Shuster made written demand to ACT for payment of
wages for his work from October 1, 1992 through October 14, 1992.
5.

On October 19, 1992 ACT wrote Mr. Shuster and refused to

pay any wages whatsoever for this two-week period, on the grounds
that "no commissions were earned" during that period. ACT paid no
wages at all at that time for that two-week period of work.
6. On November 19, 1992, Mr. Shuster again wrote and demanded
the "gross pay" of $750 provided for in the Employment Agreement.
Mr. Shuster further informed ACT that its failure to pay him any
amount whatsoever not only violated the Agreement but violated state
and federal minimum wage law.
7. On or about December 1, 1992 ACT paid Mr. Shuster gross pay
of $340, representing minimum wage for 80 hours of work; but again
2

failed and ret use. i I

| iy

\ he full gross pay totalling $750 as

demanded in accordance with the Employment Agreement.
8

Mr

Shuster made written demand for "gross pay" of $750

under the Agreement on or about' November ' '* • ' "',"l-»« wh i rh wa a; more
than 15 days before bringing this action on December 14, 1992.
9

r commenced this action on December 1 4, l 992

which is within 60 days of his separation finni A n M «\mp] uyment.

CONCLUSION- u* LAW
1,

The

interpretation

of

the contract betweei :i defendant

employer ACT and plaintiff employee Mr. Shuster is a matter of law.
2,

The h'mploymenl

ALjieeoient "ii nmpil»iqiH >us.

it calls tor wages to be paid to Mr. Shuster

In paragraph 6

r^e minimum amount

o f C« 3 5 0 0 gr oss pay per month.
3,

At the time Mi , Shustei ' s (.nip] * -yitw.. n t - ndod

to wages due under the Employment Agreement, paragrapi w
week?

or $750 gross pa%

obligation
ended;

Paragraph

-

pay commission-

„ed
.. .

wo

limited ACT's
in, employment

alter ACT's obligation

;jv

wages as per

Fa rag
4..

Mr. Shuster is today entitled

in '!' I 11) waypw i aider t lie

contract.
5

Mr. Shuster the wages due and owing
3

upon termination, Mr. Shuster is entitled to a penalty of 60 days
wages under the Utah Payment of Wages Act (Utah Code Ann. 34-28-5)
of $3000.
6.

Mr. Shuster made a written demand for wages at least 15

days before bringing this action and the demand did not exceed the
amount justly due; but ACT did not pay Mr. Shuster the wages due
him.

Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 34-27-1 Mr. Shuster

is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees for prosecuting this
action.
7. It is reasonable, in light of the time, effort, difficulty,
and other relevant factors to award Mr. Shuster attorneys fees and
costs as requested in his attorneys' affidavit of $1761.07.
Therefore the Court grants judgment in the amount of $410
prayed for in the complaint and the penalty of $3000 as prayed for
in the complaint and the attorneys' fees as provided for in the
statute.

Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees of $1761.07 as prayed

for by the affidavit.

/^V'^^^'J/'X

Dated: ^ / W / 2 / 'frf

'M^^f^^f
DeQnig.^'lfMch^,'
C i r c u i V Ctfui't

4
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TabL

-•£«,-

A'J5 2 ;>?9<<
^i<G

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

LEE K. SHUSTER,

*
*

Plaintiff,

*

JUDGMENT

vs.
*
*

APPLIED COMPUTER
TECHNIQUES, INC.

Ciy^l No. 920016945 CV
vtfudge Denni s M, F'ichs

Defendant*
•

Tl li s acti on came before the Court, Honorable Dennis ;-•: - ,:::s,
Circuit Judge, presiding,

*

Motions for Summary ^Judgment pursuant
Civil Procedure, ru;
of material fact a n d - >.

Plaintiff's
^

,.;.*.:-

. -. ::>f

eason that there a r e n o disputed issues
;f f ia nut it led fn .Judgment a s a matter

of law on all c o u n t s ,
II is ordered and adjudged:
That Plaintiff, L e e Shuster recover of i he
Computer

Techniques,

-

dant Applied

im of $ 5 1 7 1 , 07 ,, (representing
1

$410.00 for contract damages, $3000.00 for civil penalties and the
sum of $1761.07 for attorneys' fees and costs) with interest
thereon at the rate of.-£*% as provided by law.
3

Dated at Salt Lake City, UT, this

'

dhdate of

March, 1994.

....

„ JSafrfr

Dennis 4p. FuchsT Cicruit Court Judge
Vcvv.
Clerk of Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Judgment were mailed, postage prepaid, on this

th day

of March, 1994, to:
Linda Faye Smith (4460)
Attorney for Plaintiff
c/o University of Utah
College of Law
Salt Lake City, UT 84112

Thomas R. Blonquist (0369)
Attorney for Defendant
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City; UT 84102

Clerk

2

